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INTRODUCTION
A new international actor, the self-enforcing regime ("SER"),'
threatens the way states form and support values in the international
*Acting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am deeply indebted to the
research assistance of Clara W. Mak and James J. Miuccio, Brooklyn Law School, Class of
2003, and to Brooklyn Law School's Summer Research Program. I am grateful for the com-
ments of the members of the International Trade Committee at the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York. I am also grateful for the comments of Nathaniel Berman, Lan Cao,
Michael Cleaver, Ted Janger, Roberta Karmel, Daniel Medwed, Suzanne Offerman, Joseph
Rand, Scott Shauf and Spencer Weber Waller.
1. See discussion infra Part III.A. I use the term "self-enforcing" to refer to a regime or
institution capable of imposing meaningful costs for non-compliance with its rules with some
degree of autonomy, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). A non-self-enforcing re-
gime, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), lacks an autonomous method of
securing compliance. A third type of regime is the non-conflictual regime. Non-conflictual
regimes focus on coordination problems, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization,
where compliance arises from successful coordination. See Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295; Lisa L. Martin & Beth A. Simmons,
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arena. SERs "self enforce" by imposing direct costs on noncompliance.
SERs secure compliance with their norms without resort to the "norma-
tive feedback loop."2
The normative feedback loop is both the mechanism states use to
consult national values in their international actions and the bridge be-
tween national and international value formation. This article proposes
that it also links the liberal and constructivist theoretical schools of in-
ternational relations and, ultimately, suggests the middle ground of
"modified constructivism."
A modified constructivist framework suggests that emerging SERs
dilute the normative feedback loop.3 Although SERs may be desirable for
many reasons, modified constructivism predicts that the dilution of the
normative feedback loop potentially will have a multilayered effect on
international norm development and national identity formation. This
article does not propose to curtail, avoid, or disable SERs; rather, it pro-
poses assessing and, where appropriate, responding to their effects on
international and national value and identity formation.
To illustrate the normative feedback loop and modified constructiv-
ism, imagine Country X and Country Y seek to avoid the dangers of an
anarchic struggle for power and to reap coordination benefits and effi-
ciencies. Country X, a western, wealthy, relatively powerful and a once
protectionist nation, joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") 4 in 1955, which evolved into the World Trade Organization
("WTO").5 In 1994, Country X signed the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES").6
Country Y, a lesser developed and protectionist nation, joined the WTO
in 1995, but resolved not to sign CITES.
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions, 52 INT'L ORG. 729, 744 (1998)
[hereinafter Martin & Simmons] (discussing coordination regimes as having "multiple Pareto-
optimal equilibria").
2. See discussion infra Part III.B. Robert Ellickson uses the term "feedback loop" to
describe a system that harmonizes the rules (norms) emanating from different sources, ex-
plaining that "political forces may limit the deviation of law from norms, and conversely, law
may influence a citizenry's moves." ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 132 (1991) [hereinafter ELLICKSON].
3. See discussion infra Part IV.A (suggesting a value vacuum will result from the dilu-
tion of the normative feedback loop).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].
5. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994). The article refers to the VTO as both the WTO and the
GATTIWTO.
6. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
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Signatories to CITES are obliged to prohibit trade in products on
Appendix I of CITES.7 Because Country X's constitution requires it to
enact domestic legislation in order to comply with treaty obligations,
Country X passed a law prohibiting the importation of articles listed in
Appendix I, which includes the Pantholops hodgsonii (the Tibetan Ante-
lope). Country X's ban prohibits products made from the Tibetan
Antelope, including "shahtoosh;" a fine wool made from the hair of the
Tibetan Antelope.
As a non-signatory to CITES, Country Y began to export shahtoosh,
which is not allowed entry into Country X. The WTO generally prohibits
the discrimination of "like products" by members.8 Problematically, both
countries are members of the WTO, and shahtoosh wool is arguably
"like" every other type of wool given unrestricted access into Country X.
When Country X tries to comply with its obligations under CITES to
the detriment of Country Y's rights under the WTO, modified construc-
tivism suggests that both countries will attempt to balance their
international obligations with their national constituency preferences and
values. In doing so, they will employ the normative feedback loop and
therefore reconsider constituency values in the context of this dispute.
Country X will consider whether its constituency prefers the environ-
mental values embodied in the CITES treaty and domestic legislation
over the trade benefits that Country X receives as a member in good
standing of the WTO. Presumably, Country Y already adheres to its con-
stituency preferences by not agreeing to CITES. The question, however,
remains whether Country Y's constituency is willing to suffer whatever
repercussions the environmental regime can impose upon non-parties.
Consistent with its constituency preferences, if they remain unchanged
since 1995, Country Y will seek the benefit of the WTO's trading rules to
secure its rights to export shahtoosh to other WTO members. Finally, all
of these considerations will be influenced, in part, by each country's ma-
terial resources.
The WTO, however, unlike CITES, is a regime capable of imposing
direct costs upon regime defectors.9 As a "self-enforcing" regime, the
WTO discounts the normative feedback loop and some of its destabiliz-
ing effects, which diminishes Country X's ability to act consistently with
its constituency preferences. What effect the dilution of the normative
7. Id. at app. I.
8. GATT, supra note 4, arts. I, III, XI.
9. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] (detailing rules and procedures governing
settlement of disputes).
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feedback loop has in this example on both Country X's and Country Y's
value and identity formation is the subject of this article.
This article proposes a modified constructivist theory, which links
liberalism and constructivism through the normative feedback loop. Part
I briefly explains traditional international relations theories such as real-
ism, institutionalism, liberalism and constructivism. A modified
constructivist perspective espouses the presence of two constants: (i)
assertion of national preferences by constituents for whom the state acts
as an agent in international relations, and (ii) social construction of state
identities through interaction with other states in the international
arena.' ° Part I demonstrates how the normative feedback loop allows na-
tional values to enter international discourse and responds to the
internalization of norms that arise from socially constructed state identi-
ties. "
Part II explores regime compliance and competition, and demon-
strates how the normative feedback loop mediates conflicts between
regimes. Regimes seek compliance with their rules and norms in order to
support their values.'2 In a multiple regime world, international regimes
like the WTO and CITES compete for state compliance, which is in-
formed by the enforcement preferences of various states through the
normative feedback loop. 3 In other words, nations decide, consistent
with constituency preferences, whether to promote a regime "rule," like
protecting endangered species. Thus, the normative feedback loop rein-
troduces national constituency preferences into both the international
arena and the value and identity formation process through the selective
enforcement of regime rules.
Part III explains the emergence of SERs. SERs are regimes capable
of securing compliance with their own rules without resorting to the
normative feedback loop.'4 SERs include trade regimes such as the WTO
or the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), 5 but exclude
regimes that must entreat nations to aid in the promotion of their values
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. Id.
12. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and
Trends, 29 INT'L ORG. 557, 570-74 (1975) [hereinafter Ruggie, International Responses to
Technology] (defining regimes as "a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans,
organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of
states"). Id. at 570
13. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part III.A. SERs may not be completely "self-enforcing" in that they may
require states to bring disputes to the regime in the first instance.
15. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., pts. 1-3, 4-8




and enforcement of their rules. The labor regime, specifically the Inter-
national Labor Organization ("ILO"), and the CITES regime, provide
examples of non-SERs. 6
Part IV concludes by hypothesizing that SERs create a value vac-
uum. As SERs evolve, their efficiency, autonomy, and authority increase.
With greater institutional authority and autonomy, SERs dilute the nor-
mative feedback loop. A disabled normative feedback loop omits
national values from the evolution of international identity, and distorts
the mix of norms in the international community." SER norms will be
over-represented and the social construction of states will be affected. To
the extent that the normative feedback loop destabilizes regime function-
ing, however, its dilution may be desirable. A normative feedback loop
nevertheless serves as a valuable mechanism to interpose non-SER val-
ues. The normative feedback loop may therefore alleviate fears that
SERs thwart democratic preferences.
Several institutional modifications may compensate for the value
vacuum. These modifications include: (i) an increase in the voice given
to non-SER values within an SER through greater access or exceptions
under the SER rules; (ii) the availability of direct access by non-state
actors to SERs to compensate for the devaluations of the normative
feedback loop, and (iii) a strengthening of the compliance mechanisms
for non-SERs. 8 None of these options will fill the value vacuum, but
each may alleviate the deficit it creates. Perhaps the emergence of SERs
and their implications are simply part of a transition in the evolution of
international relations that will produce long-term benefits. Assuming
that SERs will benefit international relations in the long run, however,
there are short run consequences that demand consideration, monitoring,
and in some cases, minimization.
16. See International Labor Organization Const. and Rules, June 18, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712,
225 Consol. T.S. 378, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/mandate.htm (last
visited August 13, 2001) [hereinafter ILO Const.]. Although the ILO has more than 170 con-
ventions relating to labor standards, it has no enforcement mechanism by which it can achieve
compliance with the norms it propagates; instead, it relies upon the compliance mechanisms
discussed in Part H.A. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in Inter-
national Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 434 (2000) [hereinafter Abbott & Snidal]
(discussing ILO's strategy to adopt non-legally binding instruments in guideline form).
17. The degree of distortion may depend upon where the SER surfaces. A self-enforcing
regional trade agreement may distort less than a global SER such as the WTO. Likewise, the
level of distortion may depend upon the relative material capabilities of the affected states.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
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I. MODIFIED CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE NORMATIVE FEEDBACK Loop
Modified constructivism, a bridge between liberal and constructivist
theories, is rooted in the four dominant international relations theories:
realism, institutionalism, liberalism and constructivism.'9 Realism posits
that states act in their own interests, while constantly struggling to
achieve and maintain power.20 Institutionalist theories start from a realist
perspective, but add that states will work together within institutional
regimes to maintain stability and reduce transaction costs.2' Institutional-
ists, like realists, believe that states' interests are given, i.e., unaffected
by the inter-state system.22 Liberalism envisions that states act as agents
for the benefit of their constituencies and are therefore subject to change
through the liberal functioning of the domestic system.23 Constructivism,
like liberalism, posits that state interests are endogenous (subject to
19. For a discussion of international relations theories see generally, ANTHONY CLARK
AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1999) [hereinafter AREND, LEGAL
RULES] (discussing international relations theory); Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations
Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 361 (1999) [hereinafter Abbott, International Relations Theory]; Andrew Moravc-
sik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG.
513 (1997) [hereinafter Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously]; Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory:
A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998) [hereinafter
Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood, New Generation]. See also generally, INTERNATIONAL RE-
GIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) [hereinafter KEO-
HANE, AFTER HEGEMONY]; Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 1983) [hereinafter Krasner, Structural Causes]; Friedrich Kratochwil & John G.
Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG.
753 (1986) [hereinafter Kratochwil & Ruggie, International Organization].
20. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. As realist theory is primarily a descrip-
tive theory, I do not explore its implications at length, although some basic understanding of
realism will be necessary to grasp the parameters of the international relations theories that
respond to it. Id. Additionally, it would seem that the material resources and power of states
affects the functioning of the variables in each of the other theories.
21. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
22. See Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 522; Alexander
Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 384
(1994) [hereinafter Wendt, Collective Identity]. Thus, realists and institutionalists see states'
interests as exogenous to the inter-state system. "Exogenous" in international relations litera-
ture refers to the notion that interests are pre-established, "so even engagement in institutions
does not affect the identity of the actor, or even its perceived interests, but only its patterns of
behavior." Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Ele-
ments of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 32
(2000) [hereinafter Brunnee & Toope]. In other words, theories which assume state interests
are exogenous posit that a state's interests are developed outside of a regime and are not af-
fected by the state's interactions within the regime.
23. See Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 516 (describing lib-
eral theory's fundamental premise).
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change), but constructivism views states acting as states (not merely as
agents). Further, constructivists contend that states share and influence
each other's expectations and understandings of international law.24 Thus,
the constructivist view seems to directly contradict the realist and institu-
tionalist view that interests and identities are formed outside of the
inter-state system. Although each of the above-referenced theories are
distinct, they all represent some part of international relations and, in
some areas, they overlap.2 This article suggests that the constructivist
and liberal schools are explicitly linked by the normative feedback loop,
and should therefore be viewed as working in tandem in a type of "modi-
fied constructivism."
A. Traditional International Relations Models
Each of the traditional international relations models explains some
part of state functioning, and therefore, is useful to predict and prescribe
state conduct. Realism, a descriptive theory that depicts states in a con-
stant power struggle, has dominated international relations discourse.
Institutionalism, however, suggests that, despite the constant power
struggle, states may sometimes find it in their interest to cooperate. Both
realism and institutionalism view states' interests as given.26 Neither real-
ism nor institutionalism therefore aids in understanding how states
change individually themselves or in their interactions with one an-
other.27 Liberal and constructivist scholars provide explanations for these
changes that realism and institutionalism either neglect and/or deny.2
24. See AREND, LEGAL RULES, supra note 19, at 126-29 (outlining basic tenets of con-
structivist theory). See also Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It, 46 INT'L
ORG. 391, 394 (1992) [hereinafter Wendt, Anarchy Is] (showing link between constructivist
and liberal theories in that they "share a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in
which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalists-
behavioral one in which they are exogenous"). "Endogenous" refers to the notion that "[r]ules
and institutions have the ... effect over time of shaping actor preferences." Benedict Kings-
bury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International
Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 353 (1998) [hereinafter Kingsbury, The Concept of Compli-
ance].
25. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 717,731 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, Liberal
International Relations] ("The actual international system naturally contains Realist, Institu-
tionalist and Liberal elements'").
26. See Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and Interna-
tional Politics, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 117, 124 (1998) [hereinafter Arend, Do Legal Rules
Matter?] (discussing the role of legal rules within structural realism and rationalist institution-
alism).
27. See id.
28. See generally Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19 (demonstrating
necessity of liberal theory to understand formation of interests taken by institutional and
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Realists believe that nations, as the primary actors in the interna-
tional arena, engage in a constant power struggle. 9 In the international
system, order arises from balancing state interests, preservation, and mu-
tual quests for power. Without this balancing and pursuit of order,
anarchy would prevail.3° Institutionalism arose as a rationalist response
to realism because institutionalist theories acknowledge this power
struggle as empirically true, but view cooperation through international
institutions as a means of allowing order to emerge from the chaos of a
power struggle.3
Institutionalism explains state cooperation despite the never-ending
power struggle because institutions coordinate efforts, collect informa-
tion, create cognitive focal points, establish forums, reduce costs, and
create stability.32 The Prisoner's Dilemma model illustrates one way in
which institutions promote cooperation.33 Actors engaging in an isolated
game having the option to cooperate will choose not to cooperate in or-
der to minimize the other side's payoff and to maximize, to the extent
realist theories as givens); Wendt, Collective Identity, supra note 22, at 384 (explaining means
by which identities and interests are transformed endogenously).
29. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503, 507 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, International Law] (discussing realism).
30. See Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter?, supra note 26, at 111-12 (explaining that in the
structural realist's view of the international legal system, anarchy gives way to order through a
balancing of interests as nations pursue power).
31. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of
the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 859 (1995) [hereinafter Shell]. Shell notes:
Scholars conceived regime theory as an answer to the perceived weaknesses in real-
ist accounts of international cooperation. Regime theory combines the egoistic
assumptions of realism with the insights of game theory to explain how
international arrangements thrive in an anarchic world not dominated by any one
national power or world government.
Id. See also, e.g., Krasner, Structural Causes, supra note 19, at 1, 2 (discussing various con-
cepts of international regimes such as definitions, change, relationship between regimes and
behavior, and basic causal factors used to explain regime development); Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 205 (1993) [hereinafter Slaughter, A DualAgenda] (discussing, explaining and bridg-
ing the gap between institutionalism and liberalism); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L.
335 (1989) [hereinafter Abbott, Modern International Relations] (tracing the formation of
modern international relations theory and linking it to international law).
32. See Abbott, International Relations Theory, supra note 19, at 365-66 (explaining
how institutions change "the context of interaction"); Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter?, supra
note 26, at 120-22 (listing advantages to participating in international institutions).
33. See Abbott, Modern International Relations, supra note 31, at 358-68 (discussing
prisoner's dilemma); William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Schol-
arship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 227, 238-40 (1997)[hereinafter Aceves] (discussing
prisoner's dilemma); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of In-




possible, their own payoffs. Actors choose non-cooperation, even though
cooperation benefits both players even more, because the player cannot
be certain that her opponent will cooperate as well. Institutions promote
repetitious games so that players can engage in a "tit-for-tat" strategy
whereby they will cooperate initially, and thereafter match their oppo-
nent's moves.3 4 It therefore becomes in each player's rational self-interest
to cooperate, rather than to defect. Moreover, by providing a forum, in-
stitutions increase communication, support the collection and
dissemination of data, and reduce transaction costs.35
In the earlier example, sufficient reason exists for both Country X
and Country Y to join an institution such as the GATT/WTO. Member-
ship will help both Country X and Country Y bring order to their trading
relationships and reap the coordination and efficiency benefits that grow
from the iterated game provided by the institution.
Realism and institutionalism presume that both Country X and
Country Y's interests are exogenous, i.e., unaffected by the inter-state
system. If, however, their interests are exogenous, what motivates their
desire to join the institution? They are both different nations with differ-
ent material assets, (X is wealthy and Y is poor). How could the WTO
promote both their interests? It is difficult to understand an actor's desire
to enter a conflictual regime without the expectation that its preferences
or interests, or those of other countries, would change as a result of par-
ticipating. Country Y might choose to join the WTO in an attempt to
benefit from free trade and change its interests. Institutionalism fails to
account for the possibility of the institution itself modifying states' inter-
ests.36
If one assumes that Country X and Country Y's preferences are ex-
ogenous to the inter-state system, as realism and institutionalism do,
regime stability is unexplainable. Regime stability likely results from
states modifying their interests as a result of regime interaction (i.e.,
Country X and Country Y react to regime compromises by reassessing
and modifying their expectations and interests). By reacting to the com-
promises, Country X and Country Y may both move away from their
protectionist pasts.
Liberals believe that state interests are subject to change.37 Liberal-
ism posits that values flow into the international arena as representations
34. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 11-14 (1984) (detailing
cooperative strategies).
35. See Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter?, supra note 26, at 120-22.
36. See id. at 117, 124 (noting that participation in the international system changes
states' interests).
37. Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 516 (stating "[liberal IR
theory's fundamental premise-that the relationship between states and the surrounding
Summer 2001 ]
Michigan Journal of International Law
of changing national constituency preferences." Such constituencies ex-
press their interests through national norm creating devices,39 which may
include the following: constitutions,4° legislation,' political acts,42 judi-
cial and administrative decisions, 3 social organizations, and religious
institutions." The consideration and adoption of these interests give the
nation a liberal identity. 5 Liberals focus on the strength and nature of
domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes behavior by
influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences").
38. See id. at 516-21 (setting forth core assumptions of liberal international relations the-
ory); Slaughter, A Dual Agenda, supra note 31, at 227-28 (explaining connection between
liberalism and institutionalism); Slaughter, Liberal International Relations, supra note 25, at
727, 728 (drawing upon Moravcsik's realization that state behavior is determined "not by the
international balance of power ... but by the relationship between ... social actors and the
governments representing their interests, in varying degrees of completeness").
39. See generally, Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 338, 347-48 (1997) (discussing effect of legal rules and social
norms on human behavior). Norms and values emerge from different sources, including per-
sonal ethical sources, relationships, and society. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 126-27.
40. See, e.g., CONST. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, art. 17 (Argentina, property values); FIN. CONsT.
ch. 2, § 6 (Finland, equality values); LA CONST. art. I (France, freedom of religion); S. AFR.
CONST. ch. 2, §§ 22, 23 (South Africa, labor values). Even countries which would not be con-
sidered "liberal democratic states" formally incorporate values into their constitutions. See,
e.g., ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA (Constitution), art. 26 (1982) (RR.C.) (dis-
cussing environmental values).
41. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86
VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories] ("By imposing
sanctions or granting subsides the law either expands or contracts the horizon of opportunities
within which individuals can satisfy their preferences. In this way society can give incentives
for desirable behavior."). See, e.g., Sex Discrimination Act, 1965, c. 65 (Eng.). See also Scott,
The Limits of Behavioral Theories, supra, at 1603 (2000) (explaining that no-smoking laws
affect people's behavior even where state does not commit resources to directly enforce laws);
Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 629-33 (1998)
[hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home] (describing norm internalization using
the United States seat belt laws as an example).
42. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1578 n.4 (2000) (citing literature showing probabil-
ity of casting decisive vote in a general election). Voting in national elections is an example of
a non-economically motivated political act. Id. The effect of one vote cannot make it eco-
nomically rational to vote in a general election. Id.
43. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2349 (1991) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation] (explaining that while
public law suits may request damages and injunctive relief, they serve to announce normative
values). See also id. at 2364-65 (referring to "growing acceptance by litigants of [the] United
States courts as instruments of social change"). See generally, Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (explaining that judicial interpretation involves
giving expression to the values of the legal text and that the interpretive process is bounded by
community, which gives the process authority).
44. See Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
699, 701 (2000) (recognizing many types of norms include "social, cultural, professional,
moral, religious, and familial").
45. See Slaughter, International Law, supra note 29, at 511, 529 n.57 (1995) (defining a
liberal democracy as one which allows for representative government and a non-liberal state as
[Vol. 22:673
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national interests to predict states' actions in the international arena. 6
States remain important under the liberal theory, but are viewed as sur-
rogates for individual and group preferences. 7
Adopting a liberal view shifts the perspective from a power struggle
to an interest struggle.48 States' interests become subject "to capture and
recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social ac-
tors. '49 Liberal theory suggests that Country X recently signed CITES
and Country Y did not because each country, in part, reacts to constitu-
ency values expressed through its domestic political structure. Perhaps
Country Y's lack of action is a response to its constituency values; as a
poor nation, an environmental agenda is likely not a high priority. Coun-
try X must enact domestic legislation to comply with CITES. ° Assuming
that Country X is a liberal state employing a representative form of gov-
ernment with adequate process and procedure, domestic legislation
directly expresses some constituency preferences.5'
one "that has neither a representative government nor a market economy"). Slaughter explains
that liberal theory mandates "a distinction among different types of States based on their do-
mestic political structure and ideology." Id. at 504.
46. Slaughter, A Dual Agenda, supra note 31, at 227-28 (explaining the core assumptions
of liberal theory).
47. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, the World Trade Organiza-
tion, and the Liberal Project to Reconceptualize International Law, 5 YB. INT'L ENVTL. L. 1,
7-8 (1994) [hereinafter Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy]. The groups represented in
the liberal model include transnational actors. Id. at 7. A nation could not possibly represent
all of the preferences of its people, but arguably the process by which it incorporates those
which it does legitimizes the ultimate expression.
48. See Slaughter, Liberal International Relations, supra note 25, at 729. Andrew Mo-
ravcsik explains liberalism's three core assumptions: (i) individuals and private groups operate
within domestic and civil society to pursue ideational and material interests; (ii) state interests
pursued in the international arena represent a portion of these individual interests; and (iii)
interdependent state preferences determine state behavior. Moravcsik, Taking Preferences
Seriously, supra note 19, at 516-21.
49. Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 518.
50. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Bureau of National Affairs
International Trade Reporter recently reported that "[e]ven though CITES has been in place
since 1973, most of the 140 countries signed on to the convention still do not have legislation
in place to implement the legislation and penalize those engaged in illegal trade." Officials
Cite Need to Address Growing Illegal Environmental Trade, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 913,
924 (June 14, 2001).
51. See Slaughter, Liberal International Relations, supra note 25, at 728 ("State prefer-
ences are derivative of individual and groups preferences, but depend crucially on which
individuals and groups are represented.") (citation omitted); Slaughter, International Law,
supra note 29, at 508 (assuming while governments represent a subset of their constituency,
they regulate activities of those not represented as well). Due to the pluralistic nature of soci-
ety, a state will only reflect some constituency preferences, -and the process by which it
chooses which constituency preference to promote is subject to capture. Id. Moravcsik ac-
knowledges the possibility for specific groups to "capture" a democratic government when the
balance of representation is in their favor. See Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra
note 19, at 530 ("The key variable in republican liberalism is the mode of domestic political
representation, which determines whose social preferences are institutionally privileged."). In
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Theoretically, each nation's decision to join the WTO was, in itself,
an expression of constituency preferences. Because Country X and
Country Y joined at different times, however, their actions may signify
different interests. The intervening evolution of GATT to the WTO may
suggest differing constituency preferences for each country. Country X
joined when GATT operated under a negotiation model, whereas Coun-
try Y joined when the trading regime shifted to an adjudication model.
Although, Country X remained in the regime, it is not clear whether both
countries held uniform constituency preferences. Delineating those pref-
erences requires a conflict or dispute forcing Countries X or Y to take
action, which would cause either country to reconsider constituency
preferences depending upon the circumstances. Where such preferences
change, either country may find it undesirable to support the values and
accept the obligations of the WTO.
Liberal theory, in short, can help explain things that institutionalism
and realism cannot. Liberalism, as well as constructivism, characterizes
states' interests as endogenous, and thus it illuminates what Friedrich
Kratochwil and John Ruggie refer to as the ontological and epistemo-
logical conflict of regimes. 2 Ontologically (the nature of), regimes focus
on actors' intersubjective expectations. 3 Epistemologically (the source of
knowledge of), regimes are generally positivistic,54 and thus promote
behavior through objective forces. 5  Liberalism helps explain the
contradiction between the objective epistemology of regimes and the
intersubjective ontology of regimes by reference to endogenous prefer-
ences. The nature of the regime therefore changes as a result of changing
preferences, and contradicts its epistemology. Although a regime may
seek to act objectively, its nature is forever linked to the evolution of sub-
jective preferences. Its epistemology can either change, thus becoming
less positivistic, or the regime can cease to respond to its nature. If the
a similar vein some expression of "preferences" are rhetorical devices, such as rarely enforced
adultery statutes, which remain codified in many states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2
(1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (West 2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-301 (2001);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (Michie 2000); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (2000); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (1996). The value sup-
posedly promoted by these statutes is respect for the family. See Commonwealth v. Stowell,
449 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Mass. 1983) (noting that although criminal prosecution under statute is
extremely rare, "[t]he statute remains as a permissible expression of public policy").
52. See Kratochwil & Ruggie, International Organization, supra note 19, at 764-66 (ex-
plaining apparent ontological and epistemological contradiction within regimes).
53. Id. at 764.
54. Id. (explaining conflict between prevailing positivist epistemology of regimes and in-




epistemology changes, then regime-promoted values will change with
constituency preferences.
Liberalism also provides an explanation for regime stability -as a
function of domestic interest realignment with regime rules and values.56
Domestic preferences not only influence regimes, but promote domestic
investment in that regime and embed regime preferences within the do-
mestic sphere. Liberalism thus helps explain the reciprocal reality
existing between national and international preferences. When Country
X joined GATT it may have had a host of protectionist trade policies de-
signed to benefit various constituencies. Over time, however, other
constituencies may have recognized particular trade investments as prof-
itable depending on GATT's success. Those constituencies invested in
the new system which caused Country X to shift its preferences.
Liberalism, however, cannot fully explain why Country X enacted its
domestic endangered species legislation. Assuming the changing prefer-
ences of Country X lean toward environmentally conscientious behavior,
the choice to protect the Tibetan Antelope remains unclear. Logically,
Country X's constituency would start protecting species indigenous to
Country X first, and consider the Tibetan Antelope later. Perhaps Coun-
try X's constituency is a globally sensitive constituency, but if so, the
means by which it became sensitized is uncertain.
Constructivist theory rightly suggests part of Country X's decision to
protect the Tibetan Antelope arises from its experiences in the interna-
tional arena.7 Constructivism posits that "an authentic community of
actors exists in international politics, and that these actors construct their
56. See Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 537 (explaining that
stability results when domestic groups adjust their preferences to make policy reversal more
costly).
57. Wendt, Collective Identity, supra note 22, at 385. Wendt explains that constructivism
makes the following core claims:
(1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory;
(2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than mate-
rial; and
(3) state identities and interests are an important part constructed by these so-
cial structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human
nature or domestic politics.
Id. Although constructivism may complement other theories, as Wendt point outs, "[tihe sec-
ond claim opposes realism" while "[t]he third opposes systemic theories that are rationalist in
form." Id. at 385. The first claim opposes liberalism, as liberalism sees states acting as agents
for their constituencies, whereas constructivists see states acting in their own interests. Wendt,
Anarchy Is, supra note 24, at 394 (noting liberals and constructivists agree, and oppose ration-
alists, in seeing that liberal interests are endogenous). Nevertheless, although a complete
critique of constructivism is beyond the scope of this article, it seems difficult to deny that
material resources will play an important role in interest and identity formation.
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own social structure and then live and interact within it."58 Put simply,
international actors operate within a social structure,59 influencing and
learning from each other,' contributing to each other's identity.6' As both
liberal and constructivist theories suggest, state identities are subject to
change, and norms collected at the international level contribute to those
identities.62
Constructivists view the formation of state identities as collective
and intersubjective, based on more than material capabilities.63 Intersub-
jective identity operates within and without institutions, and aids in
defining material capabilities as well. ' The constructivist approach is
sociological as well as economic ;65 it recognizes that states' material and
non-material elements form the international infrastructure while simul-
taneously intermingling other states' material and non-material elements
in the international arena.66
58. David J. Bederman, Review Essay: Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in In-
ternational Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 469, 476-77 (2001) [hereinafter Bederman, Review Essay]
(reviewing Anthony Clark Arend's book entitled LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCI-
ETY).
59. See Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 47
INT'L ORG. 565, 566 (1993) [hereinafter Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers]
(arguing that international organizations, such as UNESCO, influence states). It is at least
arguable that non-state actors may influence the social construction of states in the interna-
tional arena. See id.
60. Id. at 576-91 (demonstrating how UNESCO influenced nations to adopt norms sup-
porting science policy).
61. See John Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the
Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'L ORG. 855, 856 (1998) [hereinafter Ruggie, What
Makes the World Hang Together?] (explaining that "constructivism is about human conscious-
ness and its role in international life").
62. See Wendt, Collective Identity, supra note 22, at 385 (stating the core claims of con-
structivism). See also Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance, supra note 24, at 358-60
(explaining constructivist theories of compliance).
63. Wendt, Collective Identity, supra note 22, at 389 (noting that "[I]ntersubjective struc-
tures give meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meaning that actors act"). Material
ingredients include resources and assets that give a nation power, such as "military might,
economic resources, natural and physical resources and the like." Arend, Do Legal Rules Mat-
ter?, supra note 26, at 127.
64. See Wendt, Collective Identity, supra note 22, at 389. See also Ruggie, What Makes
the World Hang Together?, supra note 61, at 879 ("[Tlhe building blocks of international
reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as
instrumental dimensions."); Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter?, supra note 26, at 127-29.
65. Wendt, Collective Identity, supra note 22, at 385 (asserting that since constructivists
are more interested in "construction of identities and interests," they necessarily "take a more
sociological than economic approach").
66. See, e.g., AREND, LEGAL RULES, supra note 19, at 127. Not only are international re-
lations socially constructed, but the components included in the mix are both material (assets)
and non-material (values and norms). Id. at 128.
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Constructivism helps explain the impact of other countries' views on
Country X. We can speculate that Country X's protection of the Tibetan
Antelope is in some way connected to CITES, which represents a con-
glomeration of a variety of state preferences and identities. Likewise, we
can suppose that the repeated discourse and iterated play in the
GATT/WTO plausibly moves both countries along the protectionist con-
tinuum toward freer trade. Eventually, Country Y may assume the role of
protector of the Tibetan Antelope either because its own national values
have shifted towards an environmentally conscientious stance or because
of what Harold Koh calls "norm internalization" the process by which
the domestic agenda accepts international values and norms.67 Country Y,
like Country X, may ultimately recognize the international norm to pro-
tect the Tibetan Antelope and validate that norm through similar
domestic political structures.
B. Modified Constructivism and the Normative Feedback Loop
This article proposes a modified constructivist theory, which links
liberalism and constructivism through the normative feedback loop. A
modified constructivist perspective espouses the presence of two con-
stants: (i) assertion of national preferences by constituents for whom the
state acts as an agent in international relations and (ii) social construc-
tion of state identities through interaction with other states in the
international arena. The link between these two factors is the normative
feedback loop, a mechanism by which states consult national values in
their international actions.
67. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 41, at 642-55. Harold Koh's the-
ory of transnational legal process is related to the international relations constructivist theory.
Id. at 675. Koh explains that "[l]egal internalization occurs when an international norm is
incorporated into the domestic legal system and becomes domestic law through executive
action, legislative action, judicial interpretation, or some combination of the three." Id. at 642.
The process of internalization occurs over time and may involve state and non-state actors. Id.
at 642-48. Professor Koh illustrates the process of internalization using China's signing of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the fall of 1998. Id. at 676.
Once Chinese executive officials have agreed to accept those norms, however
grudgingly, the transnational process forces described earlier will begin to put pres-
sure upon China-with the assistance of both governmental and nongovernmental
actors-in various international fora to comply with various norms associated with
that treaty. As international sanctions begin to attach to those norms, a process of
vertical internalization will predictably commence, however slowly. China's domes-
tic institutions will have an incentive to adopt default rules that avoid routine
noncompliance with the international rule. Thus, over time, acceptance of the inter-
national rule should have a liberalizing impact, even upon states that have proven
relatively impervious to external influence.
Id. at 676. (citations omitted).
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Like the liberal agency model, and unlike constructivism, modified
constructivism accepts (and requires) that states act as agents for their
people. 68 As a descriptive matter, the truth of the liberal agency model
seems apparent, though incomplete; states' interests reflect the desires of
their constituency.69 First, states' interests must change in order for states
to adapt to changing contexts70 because, otherwise, no hope would exist
for institutions, regimes, compromise or progress. Change, however, is
not always for the better because it can also propel a nation away from
compromise or progress. Second, states' interests change as a result of
several motivating factors7' such as the investment made by constituen-
cies in change. When Country Y joins the WTO, for example, its
constituencies may feel free to invest in the production of shahtoosh
wool, knowing that trading rules protect their efforts. As constituencies
invest in the production of shahtoosh wool, their preference for a trading
regime with predictable and stable rules increases. Thus, the investment
in an international institution sews the values of that institution into the
domestic fabric. Other motivators of change include increased informa-
tion, exposure to issue networks, norm internalization, and national norm
evolution.
Liberalism, however, cannot operate independently nor fully explain
Country X's and Country Y's state identity formation without a construc-
tivist element. Liberalism alone will likely not explain why Country X
chose to protect the Tibetan Antelope. Without international influences,
people in Country X would likely not use any resources to protect the
Tibetan Antelope. Although well-traveled or well-informed citizens of
Country X perhaps saw the beauty of the Tibetan Antelope and shared
their appreciation for the species, it seems likely that Country X's con-
cern for the Tibetan Antelope is partially influenced by international
norms emanating from CITES or other international issue networks.
Modified constructivism accepts the constructivist idea that states affect
the interests and identities of other states through interaction in the inter-
national arena.
68. See generally, supra notes 36-67 and accompanying text.
69. Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 518-22. Wendt, Anarchy
Is, supra note 24, at 394 (arguing state interests are endogenous).
70. Wendt, Collective Identity, supra note 22, at 391 (explaining that the evolution of a
community, such as a trading community, is explained only by examining "the effect of prac-
tice on interests and identities").
71. See Robert 0. Keohane, When Does International Law Come Home?, 35 Hous. L.
REV. 699, 710-13 (1998) (commenting on Koh's theory of norm internalization and suggest-
ing several factors that promote changes in states' interests).
72. See Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics,
38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 487,490 (1997) [hereinafter Keohane, Two Optics] (noting regimes offer
incentives for groups, governments and private individuals to modify their behavior).
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Constructivism likewise suggests an important place for liberalism
and the evolution of domestic preferences.73 Constructivist theory is in-
determinate and impossible to verify empirically.74 Therefore, liberal
theory may, by connecting international norms to national constituency
preferences, explain why some norms grow popular while others fail."
As Andrew Moravcsik notes, "without a theory of domestic preference
formation, how can a constructivist specify which feedback processes of
socialization matter.. ?,,76 Modified constructivism therefore suggests that
referencing national norm preferences helps gauge the potency of an in-
ternational norm.
Scholars note that deficiencies exist in both constructivism and lib-
eralism. 7 Both theories fail to completely explain state behavior.78
Arguably, both theories discount too greatly the importance of power
and material assets. Perhaps the descriptive truth of the realist and insti-
tutionalist accounts explains the deficiencies of the liberal and
73. See Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 539 (arguing for more
consideration of liberal theories).
74. Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter?, supra note 26, at 134-35 (addressing the criticism
that constructivist theory lacks empirical support). Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J. Toope have
attempted to respond to this criticism by proposing a research agenda that employs a non-
positivist conception of law, specifically an "interactional" understanding of law based upon
the work of Lon Fuller. Brunnee and Toope, supra note 22, at 24. Brunnee and Toope believe
that this course of study can help to explain why some norms are more influential than others.
Id.
75. Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 539-40 (explaining that
liberal hypotheses offer "a theory of when the transnational transmission of ideas matter").
Other disciplines may be useful in overcoming this indeterminacy. Martha Finnemore argues
that sociology's institutionalism may be useful in telling us not only that social structures
matter (as constructivism does) but also how they matter. See generally Martha Finnemore,
Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism, 50 INT'L ORG.
325 (1996) [hereinafter Finnemore, Sociology's Institutionalism]. Sociology's institutionalism
should not be confused with international relations institutionalism; indeed, it is more closely
related to constructivism. Id. at 326.
76. Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 539 (arguing for more
consideration of liberal theories in order to avoid omitted variable bias).
77. See AREND, LEGAL RULES, supra note 19, at 132-34 (discussing three criticisms of
constructivism: the apparent lack of empirical evidence supporting its claims, the inherent
difficulty in determining exactly how the state affects the institution, and that constructivism
can only be understood using truly intersubjective law because its meaning naturally differs
from culture to culture). See also Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at
514-15 (outlining a critique of liberalism); Slaughter, A DualAgenda, supra note 31, at 237-
38 (same).
78. See, e.g., AREND, LEGAL RULES, supra note 19, at 132-34 (explaining that under con-
structivism, it is often difficult to discern how states affect institutions and vice versa).
Slaughter suggests that the lack of an ability to make deductions from the core assumptions of
liberalism, and the possibility that the theory will contribute no more than rationalism and
institutionalism already have, are two possible flaws of liberalism that must be overcome. See
Slaughter, A Dual Agenda, supra note 3 1, at 237. The normative feedback loop proposes to fill
both of these gaps.
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constructivist views. Additionally, this article proposes another possible
means to help complete these theories. This article suggests that the
normative feedback loop fills the void in each theory while linking the
two schools together.
Nations, in response to regimes, balance the value of rule compli-
ance against other interests they may have by means of the normative
feedback loop.79 The normative feedback loop may take the form of a
nation's decision to:
(i) comply with a regime rule which would require it to act (or
not to act);
(ii) encourage another nation to comply (or not) with a regime
rule;
(iii) enact (or refuse to enact) domestic legislation to promote re-
gime values.
Where compliance implicates a conflict between regime values, the
normative feedback loop aids in the ordering of regime hierarchies and
allows the states to insert their norms into the international system.
First, the normative feedback loop may take the form of a nation's
decision to comply with a regime rule, which would require it to act (or
not act). The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute under GATT, which involved provi-
sions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), ° illustrates the
availability of different choices to support or reject regime norms." The
MMPA provided for the protection of dolphins by prohibiting the impor-
tation into the United States of tuna caught in a manner that endangered
and killed dolphins. Two GATT panels found the MMPA violated GATT
Article Xl's prohibition on import bans. The United States, however,
prevented adoption of the GATT Panel Reports.82 The protection of ani-
mals from a horrible and unnecessary death was a value that the United
79. Additionally, the normative feedback loop operates in the absence of regime conflict
as a check on state activity in light of changing constituency preferences.
80. See Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 11-13 (discussing
Tuna-Dolphin controversy). The MMPA is an example of a domestic legal structure supplying
the normative feedback loop and, as Benedict Kingsbury notes, "[t]he actual imposition of
sanctions [under the MMPA] followed court orders obtained by environmental groups against
the executive branch." Id.
81. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I]; GATT Dispute Settlement Panel
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter
Tuna-Dolphin II]. See generally, Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47.
82. See Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 11-13 (noting that
neither Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report was adopted); RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:




States refused to forgo in order to support the value of the trading re-
gime.83 Thus, the normative feedback loop supported non-compliance
with GATT norms.
Second, the normative feedback loop may also take the form of a na-
tion's decision to encourage another nation to comply with a regime rule.
This use of the normative feedback loop illustrates the overlap of the
realist and liberal accounts. Prior to the Uruguay Round, for instance, the
United States used the threat of unilateral retaliation to change policies
which affected United States commerce. As the nation imposing the
sanction, the United States held sole discretion and capability to utilize
unilateral retaliation. Thus, prior to the Uruguay Round, Country X
might have coerced Country Y to stop trading in the Tibetan Antelope, if
it so desired.
Finally, the normative feedback loop may impact domestic legisla-
tion that specifically adopts or implements a particular set of regime
values. The United States' Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP")
legislation, for example, which affords trade preferences to developing
nations, incorporates international labor standards." As domestic legisla-
tion, the GSP statute implicates the normative feedback loop, because in
a liberal state, national legislation considers constituency values and
preferences.8' A country may similarly refuse to enact domestic legisla-
tion designed to promote compliance with a regime rule as a result of its
normative feedback loop.
The normative feedback loop allows a nation to revisit its policy de-
cisions concerning the weight or vitality of constituency preferences. In
other words, a nation's initial belief that it is within its interests to join a
regime does not demand the conclusion that it will forever be committed
that specific regime's norms. Robert Hudec explains the need to revisit
such decisions in the context of GATT:
83. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658, 678-79 (1996)
[hereinafter Nichols] (explaining dolphins caught in tuna nets were often drowned, ground to
death in ship's winch gears or eaten alive by sharks).
84. See John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance
and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 183
(1997) [hereinafter Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate]. Typically, this unilateralism
was accomplished through the infamous Section 301 legislation, 19 U.S.C. § 2411. During the
Uruguay rounds, negotiators sought to persuade the United States to give up Sec. 301 in ex-
change for the new Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). See generally BHALA, supra
note 82, at 1267-55. Although the DSU came to be, the United States did not repeal Sec. 301.
Id. It has, however, refrained from using it. Id.
85. GSP deviates from WTO/GATY foundational theory by allowing for preferential
treatment for less developed nations.
86. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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The kind of liberal trade policy expressed by the GATT rules has
never commanded universal approbation. The fact that govern-
ments were able to agree to these rules meant simply that the
forces in each government favoring the rules were, on balance,
stronger than those opposing. Support for the rules once written
has been the product of a similar balance, a balance quite capa-
ble of shifting from case to case.87
Applying Hudec's theory, Country X's decision to enter the trading
regime in 1955 and to remain in the trading regime when the GATT
evolved into the WTO does not necessitate the conclusion that it wishes
to promote trade values at the expense of the Tibetan Antelope. The
normative feedback loop accounts for both the decision to join the GATT
and to stay in the WTO. Under a modified constructivist framework, the
normative feedback loop should likewise inform Country X whether it
wishes to accept its WTO obligations at the expense of the Tibetan Ante-
lope when a dispute arises with Country Y
The normative feedback loop has not only the potential to directly
affect the ordering of regime hierarchies, but also has a signaling effect.
The normative feedback loop challenges (or supports) the values of the
international arena and, by doing so, sends a message about national val-
ues." Although the normative feedback loop may not be outcome
determinative in such situations, it plays an informational role that fur-
thers the processing of other actors' future cost-benefit analyses. 9
Likewise, the normative feedback loop also signals constituency prefer-
ences in the absence of conflict, such as in coordination regimes.
Although its function in non-conflicting situations is not outcome deter-
minative, it is still important for discourse and information to aid
traditional compliance factors even without regime competition.'
Problems, however, exist within a modified constructivist frame-
work. Modified constructivist theory is subject to attack as it contradicts
87. Robert E. Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1310 (1971).
88. Cf Wendt, Anarchy Is, supra note 24, at 404-05. Wendt explains that the first step in
forming an intersubjective understanding is a "social act," which consists of signaling, inter-
preting and responding. Id. In order to demonstrate this process, he constructs a hypothetical
situation consisting of two actors, "ego" and "alter." In the hypothetical, "ego" signals by
making a gesture affecting "alter." "Alter" interprets the signal using two factors, the physical
qualities of "ego" and the gesture, and "alter's" belief about what it would have intended had it
done the same thing. Then, "alter" responds, completing the social act. Id. The repetition of a
"social act" creates expectations about future behavior. Id. at 404-05.
89. Id. (The "process of signaling, interpreting and responding completes a 'social act'
and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings").
90. See infra Part II.A (discussing traditional compliance factors).
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the realist and institutionalist descriptive accounts. 91 Perhaps, however,
modified constructivism can take greater account of the importance of
power in the inter-state and domestic systems. Modified constructivism
recognizes states' interests and identities as affected by liberal function-
ing and social construction. Domestic preferences may also be
"constructed" and the inter-state system may operate as a liberal system
itself. Whether interests or identities are constructed or expressed
through a liberal system, it seems possible that power and material re-
sources can affect the evolution of those interests and identities.
Mapping the effect of the material assets in any given situation may be
extraordinarily complex, if not impossible, but the complexity of the
formula is no reason to ignore its variables.
Additionally, assuming the principles of modified constructivism
hold true as a descriptive matter, the question of whether they are norma-
tively desirable remains. The notion of states acting as the liberal agents
of constituencies certainly seems desirable, as it is consistent with no-
tions of representative government and democratic accountability." It
does, however, raise the problem of capture; if states represent constitu-
ency interests, then they only represent a part of them.93 As a normative
matter, therefore, the model is desirable only where a liberal state exists
that employs fair process, representation, and access.9" Finally, the nor-
mative feedback loop has the potential to destabilize regime functioning.
A routine disregard of regime commitments by nations because of do-
mestic preferences threatens regime benefits.
The effect of one nation on another nation under modified construc-
tivist theory presents both benefits and detriments. Global pluralism
likely will lead to a beneficially healthy and legitimate discourse. 95 In-
creased inclusiveness promotes legitimacy and compliance.96
91. Cf. Wendt, Anarchy Is, supra note 24, at 391-92 (differentiating between liberal and
constructivist theories and realist or rationalist theories); see also Moravcsik, Taking Prefer-
ences Seriously, supra note 19, at 514 (responding to criticism that liberal theory is
"utopian").
92. See Slaughter, International Law, supra note 29, at 511. Although "liberal democracy
can be defined in many ways," Slaughter defines it as "some form of representative govern-
ment secured by separation of powers, constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights,
juridical equality, and a functioning judicial system dedicated to the rule of law. These particu-
lar features of domestic political structure are important determinants of the interaction
between the State and individual and group actors in domestic and transnational society." Id.
93. Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously, supra note 19, at 518 (noting states repre-
sent some subset of domestic society).
94. See id.
95. See THoMAs M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONs 477-78
(1995) [hereinafter FRANCK, FAIRNESS] (stating that interaction in the international community
breeds fairness and legitimacy discourse).
96. See id. at 30 ("The more plausible a community's perception of a rule's legitimacy,
the more persuasive that rule's claim to fairness, the stronger its promotion of compliance, and
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Detrimentally, however, powerful states will arguably dominate the dis-
course and have an undue influence on identity formation. To some
extent, access, process, and transparency ameliorate these effects. The
danger of a hegemonic influence nonetheless exists despite placing that
danger in a realist, institutionalist, liberal, constructivist or modified con-
structivist framework.
II. REGIME COMPLIANCE AND COMPETITION AS MONITORED BY THE
NORMATIVE FEEDBACK Loop
The modified constructivist model provides the opportunity to hy-
pothesize how states balance their interests when one regime conflicts
with another, by using the normative feedback loop. Various compliance
models suggest that different factors promote state adherence to regime
rules (e.g., legitimacy, reputational pressure, or the threat of economic
sanctions).97 State compliance with regime rules is often an issue rooted
in regime competition, which exists because regimes' theoretical founda-
tions conflict with each other.98 Modified constructivism suggests that the
normative feedback loop influences the compliance factors of any given
compliance model, and by doing so, reintroduces national constituency
preferences into international value and identity formation.
A. Regime Compliance
The normative feedback loop mediates compliance among regimes.
Regimes seek the aid of nations to enforce regime rules.99 Although na-
the firmer its re-enforcement of the sense of community."); see also George W. Downs, Kyle
W. Danish & Peter N. Barsoom, The Transformational Model of International Regime Design:
Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 507 (2000) [hereinafter
Downs, Danish & Barsoom] (commenting on Transformational Model and inclusiveness).
97. See George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 319, 324 (1998) [hereinafter Downs, Enforcement] (discussing economic sanctions in
prisoner dilemma games); Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 72, at 499 ("concerns about repu-
tation sometimes lead to the fulfillment of commitments, but they do not always do so"). See
also generally Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
705 (1988) [hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy in the International System] (explaining how the
legitimacy of a rule encourages compliance).
98. Cf Kratochwil & Ruggie, International Organization, supra note 19, at 759 (stating
that states form regimes to coordinate, monitor, organize and control issue areas based upon
their own interests and expectations). "Under this account, governmental and private partici-
pants in a given issue area will develop a set of governing arrangements-called 'regimes'-
along with a set of ideologies and expectations, that both restrain the participants and provide
means for achieving their common aims." Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process,
75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 200 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational Legal Process].
99. Nichols, supra note 83, at 702. "So long as international regimes are not backed by
'organized international sanctions,' they will to some extent exist at the behest of national
governments. To the extent national governments are in some measure democratic, their abili-
[Vol. 22:673
The Value Vacuum
tions enter regimes, nations maintain other interests, and compliance
issues may therefore arise depending on the goals of a regime.' °° The
existence of international law, discourse, regime legitimacy, fairness, and
dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms influence compliance. 'o0
These compliance factors operate to counterbalance resistance that may
arise from competing interests.
The necessity of a compliance mechanism depends on the regime's
agenda. 2 Regimes may perform informational, managerial, and execu-
tive functions.' 3 Coordination regimes usually generate automatic
compliance by providing benefits to all participants through coordination
efficiencies.'" Conflictual regimes raise enforcement issues because the
benefits of non-compliance challenge the benefits of compliance,
°0 5
which relate directly to national constituency preferences, and thus rely
upon the normative feedback loop. In the Country X and Country Y
example, the WTO is a conflictual regime. Although adherence to WTO
norms secures benefits for both Country X and Country Y, defecting
from the CITES regime may offset the benefit of compliance with the
WTO rules of non-discrimination.
Despite that an actor voluntarily enters a regime, some form of com-
pliance mechanism may be necessary to secure compliance in conflictual
regimes. As Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie point out, because
convergent expectations form the basis of the regime, the ontology of the
regime "rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity."' °6 The intersub-
jective nature of regimes suggests that compliance issues within regimes
arise because regime participants possess different values and expecta-
tions of regimes. 107
ties to support an international trade regime depend on marshaling popular support." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
100. For a critique of regime formation and functioning see Kratochwil & Ruggie, Inter-
national Organization, supra note 19. For a review of the compliance literature see Harold
Hongju Koh, Review Essay, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?]; Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance,
supra note 24; Downs, Enforcement, supra note 97.
101. See infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
102. See Ruggie, International Responses to Technology, supra note 12, at 571-74 (ex-
plaining various functions of regimes).
103. See id. (observing regimes may gather and report information, allocate resources
and effectuate a normative order).
104. See Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance, supra note 24, at 350-51 (referring to
coordination regimes as virtually self-enforcing). The regimes are self-enforcing because they
provide for "multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria," whereas non-coordination regimes have
"equilibria that are not Pareto-optimal." Martin & Simmons, supra note 1, at 744.
105. See Downs, Enforcement, supra note 97, at 324.
106. Kratochwil & Ruggie, International Organization, supra note 19, at 764.
107. AREND, LEGAL RULES, supra note 19, at 135-36. Anthony Clark Arend discusses
that intersubjective terms exist in the international arena. Id. He provides three examples of
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Given the many opportunities to comply or defect from regime
norms, different schools of thought have attempted to construct compli-
ance models. The international legal process school, for example, argues
that the process of engaging in international law constrains state behav-
ior. ' Alternatively, the "managerial model ' 9 suggests that treaty
regimes contribute to the process of persuasion."° The managerial school
overlaps with the "transformationalist school," which views compliance
and enforcement through a constructivist lens. Transformationalists ar-
gue for de-emphasizing enforcement in favor of negotiated and managed
compliance."' A different model suggests that compliance is directly
linked to legitimacy. Thomas Franck argues that legitimacy promotes
compliance."12 Franck posits that four indications of legitimacy support
intersubjective concepts, namely, states, jurisdiction and international law. Conflict may none-
theless play a role because diverse actors may disagree on "whether a particular entity is a
state," whether or not a "particular state has jurisdiction," or "there may be disagreement about
the content of particular legal rules." Despite these conflicting beliefs, no international actor
would claim that states, jurisdiction or international law do not, in fact, exist. Id. (arguing that
intersubjective understandings exist among states).
108. See Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood, New Generation, supra note 19, at 380. Under
this model, state behavior must be justified by reference to international law:
Within these regimes, there is conceptual space for international law: law plays a
critical role both in stabilizing the expectations and in reinforcing the restraints that
regimes seek to foster. Among rational states, legal rules promote compliance with
regime norms by reducing transaction costs, providing channels for dispute-
settlement, triggering retaliatory actions, signaling states when negative responses
by other states may ensue, and requiring states to furnish information that will high-
light defections on their own part.
Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 98, at 200.
109. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)[hereinafter CHAYES
& CHAYES].
110. Id. at ch. I. Under the managerial model, nations generally comply with regime
rules because of efficiency, national interests, and regime norms. Id. (identifying considera-
tions supporting the assumption that nations tend to comply with their treaty obligations in
order to better understand problems of noncompliance). Further, the iterative process and the
discourse created by the treaty regime promote compliance. The regime guides "the evolution
of the normative structure in the direction of the overall objectives of the regime." Id. at 229
(noting that the institutionalist account fails to consider the transformationalist function of
regimes). See also Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood, New Generation, supra note 19, at 371.
"Supranational institutions may not always be able to promulgate and enforce law, but they
can and do frequently generate norms that are disseminated by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) to pressure domestic political actors." Id. This model discounts, perhaps too greatly,
the value of enforcement mechanisms. See Downs, Enforcement, supra note 97, at 328-36
(challenging managerial school's position that enforcement is irrelevant to compliance).
I ll. See Downs, Danish & Barsoom, supra note 96, at 471, 507. Advocates of this
school see strong enforcement mechanisms as detrimental because they reduce the inclusive-
ness of the regime and harm the transformational process by weakening the regime discourse.
112. See Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, supra note 97, at 706 (arguing
that "compliance is secured-to whatever degree it is-at least in part by perception of a rule
as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed").
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the "legitimacy" and "pull" of a rule:..3 determinacy (the clarity of the
textual language)," 4 symbolic validation (the lineage or pedigree which
has a signaling effect), coherence (the consistent application of the rule),
and adherence (the rule's relation to a normative hierarchy)."
5
Alternatively, the political economy school explains the "political
economy" or "institutionalist" theory of enforcement and compliance as
a "deterrence strategy designed to maintain cooperation by preventing
noncompliance from ever taking place.""6 The level of punishment, or
enforcement, as one part of the strategy,' 7 relates to the "depth of coop-
eration" in that agreement."' The depth of cooperation is "(1) the amount
of behavioral change that an agreement requires of signatories or (2) the
magnitude of the behavioral change that an agreement has actually
brought about among signatories."' Enforcement can also take the form
of incentivizing behavior whereby regime benefits are either conditioned
upon compliance, 21 or the regime's existence may shift investment pref-
erences such that compliance is its own reward.
2'
113. See id. at712.
114. Id. For example, the Montreal Protocol and CITES both "impose relatively precise
obligations." Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with
International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative Project,
I GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119, 139 (1995)[hereinafter Jacobson & Weiss]. Thus, it is "rela-
tively easy to judge whether or not states ... are fulfilling these obligations." Id.
115. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, supra note 97, at 712. Franck situ-
ates these elements as the "lawyer's approach to larger sociological, anthropological and
political questions: what conduces to the formation of communities and what induces mem-
bers of a community to live by its rules?" Id. at 713. Franck has also argued that the fairness of
international rules contributes to compliance. FRANCK, FAIRNESS, supra note 95, at 6 (observ-
ing that in the "post ontological" age of international law the most important question for
international lawyers is not only law's enforceability, but its fairness). The compliance pull of
a rule is directly related to its fairness, which results in part from process. Id. at 22.
116. Downs, Enforcement, supra note 97, at 320-21.
117. See id. at 321 (indicating punishment is part of enforcement strategy that responds
to a violation).
118. See id. at 332.
119. Id. at 332-33 (emphasis omitted).
120. See Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 72, at 500 (noting material benefits of com-
pliance). For example, the IMF and the World Bank work in tandem to provide incentives to
their 183 members to promote international monetary cooperation, to maintain stability and to
promote international trade. To be a member of the World Bank, and receive the benefits of
membership, a nation must also be a member of the IMF. Members seeking assistance from
the IMF in meeting financial obligations are often required to undertake economic reforms
consistence with the policies of the Fund and the World Bank. These "reforms" thus define the
regime norms. The economic aid for compliance with these norms operates as incentives. See
generally http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm and http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
regions.htm. Commentators have objected to this type of incentive as unfair. For example,
Nancy Alexander of the Globalization Challenge Initiative argues that the reform process of
the World Bank and IMF have detrimental effects on the countries that apply them. John F
Ince, Symbol of Controversy, UPSIDE MAG., April 1, 2001, at 2001 WL 2023065.
121. See Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 72, at 490.
Summer 2001 ]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Choosing among the various compliance models problematically
employs indeterminable empirical evidence. Difficulties arise, for exam-
ple, when evaluating the reasons for the United States' refusal to comply
with a rule promulgated by the human rights regime that prohibits sub-
jecting minors to capital punishment. 2 1 Perhaps the United States does
not feel like a member of the human rights regime, that the rule has not
received open and fair review to justify appropriate compliance pull, or
that it is simply not in the United States' utilitarian interest to comply.
The question remains whether the availability of any meaningful sanc-
tions would make a difference. Arguably, however, the issue may reside
hopelessly entrenched within national politics that render international
compliance mechanisms or theories irrelevant. 
23
The prospect of evaluating these alternatives is overwhelming.
Moreover, any compliance theory must consider the pluralism of regimes
and the actors within them. In considering compliance, one must ac-
count for "the character of the activity, the character of the accord,
country characteristics, policy history, leadership, information, the role
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), actions of other states, and
the roles of international governmental organizations (IGOs).''25
Each compliance model nevertheless suggests a place for the norma-
tive feedback loop. Factors influencing compliance include the existence
of international law, discourse, regime legitimacy, fairness, and dispute
settlement and enforcement mechanisms. The extent to which a nation
Subtler instrumentalist arguments recognize that rules, as part of the environment
faced by a state, exert an impact on state behavior. They do so, in this view, not be-
cause the norms they reflect persuade people that they should behave differently.
Rather, they alter incentives, not merely for states conceived of as units, but for in-
terest groups, organizations, members of professional associations, and individual
policymakers within governments.
Id.
122. See, e.g., Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Fiore, The Supreme Court of the United
States Has Been Called Upon to Determine the Legality of the Juvenile Death Penalty in Mi-
chael Domingues v. State of Nevada, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 215 (1999); Victor L. Streib,
Moratorium on the Death Penalty for Juveniles, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (1998). See
also Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Brown, Can a United States Treaty Reservation Provide a
Sanctuary for the Juvenile Death Penalty?, 32 U.S.F L. REV. 735 (1998); Victor L. Streib, The
Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States and Worldwide, 4 Lov. POVERTY L.J. 173 (1998).
123. See, e.g., Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 100, at 2655 ("In the human
rights area, treaty regimes are notoriously weak, and national governments, for reasons of
economics or realpolitik, are often hesitant to declare openly that another government engages
in abuses.").
124. Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 114, at 124 (listing several factors affecting a na-





engages in discourse, articulates treaty obligations, or supports enforce-
ment of treaty obligations is informed by the normative feedback loop.
B. Regime Competition
Problems surrounding compliance often derive from regime compe-
tition. 6 The various explanations for compliance assume that a reason
exists not to comply.127 Another regime's conflicting norms may provide
one reason for non-compliance, i.e., the conflicting regimes will com-
pete for a nation's compliance. 2 8 Values related to the theoretical
foundation of a regime such as labor, environment, -and cultural identity
values, for example, may clash with trade regime values. 129 Because of
the difficulty in reconciling different theoretical foundations, regime
competition is likely inevitable.
The power to regulate a sovereign's behavior within one sphere may
involve specifically protecting that sovereignty within another sphere
(e.g., trade rules affirmatively protecting state sovereignty with respect to
environmental rules). 3 ° For example, trade efficiency values may conflict
with labor, environmental, human rights, or national security values. Di-
rect conflicts may arise as a result of conflicting directives on behavior.'
126. Cf Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 9-10 (discussing
some of the fundamental problems of the international legal system). Of course, there are
international institutions that develop norms that do not compete with other norms. Two of the
earliest forms of international institutions, for example, solved coordination problems. The
Universal Postal Union was created as a result of the International Postal Congress at Bern in
1874. Ludwig Weber, Postal Communications, International Regulation, 3 ENCYLCLOPEDIA
PUB. INT'L L. 1080 (1997). The International Telegraphic Union involved 20 European coun-
tries and was formed in 1865. Convention Telegraphique Internationale, May 17, 1865, 130
Consol. T.S. 198. See Alfons Noll, International Telecommunications Union, 2 ENCYLCOPEDIA
PUB. INT'L L. 1379 (1995). See also Convention Concerning the Administration and Uphold-
ing of the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, May 31, 1865, Consol. T.S. 203, discussed in David J.
Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at
Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1996).
127. See Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance, supra note 24 (discussing compliance
under various theories of international law).
128. See Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 10 ([The number
of] "international rules and institutions constructed by sovereign states ... makes it perfectly
possible for international standards to conflict, and in extreme cases for a state to owe incom-
patible obligations to different groups of states.").
129. See Nichols, supra note 83, at 691 (noting that despite favorable WTO changes,
there still exists conflict between societal and trade values with which WTO has not dealt).
130. See Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47 at 9-10 ("As more
and more governance regimes are established, this kind of trade-off becomes harder to main-
tain.").
13 1. See generally WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report of United States-Import Pro-
hibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DSF8/R (May 15, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 832
(1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu..e/58r00.pdf [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle Report]. The Shrimp-Turtle Dispute illustrates the potential conflict; the United
States sought to act consistently with its CITES obligations to protect the endangered sea
Summer 2001 ]
Michigan Journal of International Law
The CITES treaty may prohibit trade in a particular species while the
GATT/WTO may preserve the right to trade in wool from any source,
even the Tibetan Antelope."' Alternatively, a conflict may arise where
one regime attempts to enforce its values using methods that encroach
upon another regime; the use of trade sanctions to promote human rights
provides an example. To the extent that a value conflict emerges, regime
competition arises. The winner is the regime capable of validating its
values through compliance, which may take the form of action or inac-
tion depending upon the status quo.
Regime conflict is inescapable because different regimes are based
upon different theoretical models.'33 For example, Richard Shell situates
this conflict among various trade models. He notes, the two dominant
models of the trade regime "rely heavily on normative commitments to
economic theory as a foundation for legal interpretation.'"'34 At the same
time, however, these trade values may pose a threat to distributive fair-
ness or procedural justice, which may provide the theoretical basis for
another regime, such as the labor regime.
Modified constructivist theory suggests that the normative feedback
loop mediates the above conflicts. It informs the traditional compliance
factors through reintroducing national constituency preferences within a
particular context. The operation of the normative feedback loop relies
turtle despite its obligation not to discriminate between shrimp caught by various means under
the WTO.
132. See generally id. This conflict has not arisen, but the facts of the Shrimp-Turtle case
illustrate how it could. CITES protects trade in sea turtles themselves, but not trading of
shrimp, whose capture incidentally killed sea turtles. See WTO Appellate Body Report on
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/ABIR
(Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu.e/distabe.htm [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle AB]. A species could be considered an ex-
haustible natural resource under the Article XX exceptions of the GATT. Likewise, the
Montreal Protocol allows for trade sanctions against parties and non-parties to secure compli-
ance with its provisions. Arguably, a party to the Montreal Protocol should not be able to
complain about trade sanctions, but a non-party would presumably take its complaint to the
WTO. See James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 248, 266 (2001) [hereinafter Cameron &
Gray](noting opportunity Shrimp-Turtle Panel and AB had to consider plethora of environ-
mental agreements implicated by dispute).
133. Cf Shell, supra note 31, at 907-11 (assessing theoretical foundations of various
trade models in light of non trade values). The WTO Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) Dispute
exemplifies a particularly troublesome trade conflict pitting tax policy against free trade prin-
ciples. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Issues Preliminary Ruling Against the United States in
FSC Dispute, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 979, 984-85 (June 28, 2001) (discussing latest
development in E.U. challenge to United States Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) tax system
as illegal subsidy under WTO).
134. See Shell, supra note 31, at 907 (assessing the normative foundations of regime
management model and the efficient market model). Shell proposes a "stakeholder's model,"
which would include a place for non-trade preferences. See id. at 910-11; see also infra notes
167-170 and accompanying text.
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on the inability of a regime to independently secure compliance with its
rules. As Part III, infra, notes, however, SERs disrupt the functioning of
the normative feedback loop by often independently securing compli-
ance with their rules.
III. SERs AND THE DILUTION OF THE NORMATIVE FEEDBACK Loop
SERs change the landscape of value and norm development by dis-
counting the normative feedback loop. SERs become capable of
propagating values based not only on their existing compliance factors, '35
but also on their own enforcement mechanisms. Although non-SERs will
continue to promote their values, the vitality of their persuasion dimin-
ishes through the continual reinforcement of SER values, with or without
a direct conflict between two regimes. Thus, the emergence of SERs will
tear down the existing framework for value propagation and identity
formation, thereby allowing a new framework to emerge. This frame-
work will include (i) SERs; (ii) non-SERs (in their weakened state); and,
(iii) SERs which contain exceptions or accommodations for the values of
other regimes (namely, regimes within regimes in the form of "side
agreements"). This article does not suggest that SERs are undesirable;
rather that this evolution will have significant effects for value develop-
ment under the modified constructivist model. These effects and possible
responses to them are discussed in Part IV.
A. Self-enforcing Regimes
SERs are a new source of international authority that can bypass the
normative feedback loop. Thus, SERs secure a high level of compliance
with regime rules by means of coercion, independent from any hege-
monic influences, and in addition to pre-existing compliance
mechanisms.16 SERs may evolve slowly, sometimes starting as consen-
sus-based regimes and organizations operating on a utilitarian model
while gradually gaining autonomy.'37 Once formed, SERs impose costs
upon deviations from SER rules with a certain level of autonomy. As a
135. See supra Part II.A.
136. Cf. Down, Danish & Barsoom, supra note 96, at 486-87 (explaining that under the
Chayes & Chayes approach, regimes have resources to pressure states into compliance).
137. See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Managing the Evolu-
tion of Multilateralism, 52 INT'L ORG. 397 (1998) (noting "many multilateral organizations
start out with substantially smaller memberships and generally expand over time"). See also
Downs, Danish & Barsoom, supra note 96, at 465 ("Evidence is also presented that suggests
that as multilaterals increase their level of cooperation over time (e.g., in the manner of the
E.U. or WTO), they also increase their level of enforcement, a fact for which managerial the-
ory provides little explanation.").
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result, SERs promote their values and norms without having to resort to
the normative feedback loop. SERs simultaneously maintain the standard
methods of compliance that non-SERs have, including persuasion, le-
gitimacy, and dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms. These
compliance mechanisms are, however, strengthened by virtue of a re-
gime's self-enforcing capabilities.
38
SERs are not created; rather, they evolve from non-SERs.'39 SERs
may start as simple issue networks or regimes based upon rational effi-
ciencies. 4° As institutionalism demonstrates, nations cooperate within
regimes because it is in their interests to do so."' Groups may coalesce
around a treaty, or a formal institution, or simply the continued relation-
ships and set of shared expectations among the parties.4 4 Treaties or
institutions may set standards, some specific and some hortatory. There
may be a dispute settlement mechanism based upon a variety of models
including negotiation, arbitration, or adjudication.
Where a dispute settlement mechanism exists, the regime may lack
any meaningful enforcement apparatus or method to secure compli-'43
ance. Incorporating enforcement mechanisms into a regime is difficult
where the regime is conflictual. In particular, regimes that encounter it-
erated prisoners' dilemmas constantly pose opportunities for members to
benefit by deviating from regime norms. In the early stages of the re-
gime, when distrust is high, enforcement threats may chill a nation's
138. The dilution of the normative feedback loop should not be confused with the "direct
effect" of international law. Under the United States system only self-executing treaties have
direct effect under domestic law. Under the doctrine of incorporation, however, international
law should be incorporated into national law, and acts of Congress, where possible, should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with international law. The doctrine of incorporation is not
always followed. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation
of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L. J. 479 (1998).
139. Cf Downs, Enforcement, supra note 97, at 320, 323-24 (showing that as "multilat-
erals [SERs and non-SERs] increase their level of cooperation over time.., they also increase
their level of enforcement").
140. The initial regime will likely begin as an "issue network" where there is a core
group of actors concerned about a specific set of norms and values.
141. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
142. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 16, at 446-47 (discussing how international under-
standings and agreements may begin as "soft law" and evolve over time).
143. See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a
Private-Interests System of Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111, 144 (1992) [hereinafter
Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution] (discussing EC-US Oilseeds Case).
Under the GATT system, for example, even if a dispute was brought before a panel and the
Panel Report was adopted (meaning the losing state did not "block the adoption of the report"
as it had a right to do), securing compliance with the adopted report was sometimes difficult.
Id. (discussing European Economic Community Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors
and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D.
(37th Supp.) at 86 (1991)).
[Vol. 22:673
The Value Vacuum
desire to join or remain in the regime.'" The normative feedback loop
may also prevent or hinder a nation's compliance with, or participation
in, a regime. However, just as the initial formation of an institution in-
creases benefits to members by virtue of coordination and efficiencies,
the strengthening of the institution through effective dispute settlement
increases benefits to members by providing for stability and predictabil-
ity. When investment of a critical mass in the regime is complete and the
benefits of the regime begin to accrue, there will be sufficient benefits to
members who remain in the regime. These benefits that arise from an
effective enforcement mechanism will outweigh the negative effects that
an enforcement action would impose upon any one member. Indeed, the
existence of a dispute settlement mechanism may have a chilling effect
on deviant behavior. It is therefore not surprising that institutions, where
possible, will move towards "authority" based coercion.
In using the term "authority," I adopt John Ruggie's concept of au-
thority that goes beyond the "rational-legal Weberian notion of authority
... usually depicted by the ideal type of hierarchy of pyramid,"'' 45 which
does not require formal subordination. 146 "[I]nternational authority may
be conceived as a transordinate structure"'' where collective interests
operating within regimes form joint obligations. These obligations
evolve into compliance norms that dictate national behavior. 48 Because
SERs can impose significant costs upon either non-compliance or exit,
they attain authority without formal subordination.
Effective enforcement mechanisms, along with traditional compli-
ance factors, make the above authority model possible. As noted above,
collective interests, persuasion, a sense of joint obligation, fairness, and
legitimacy contribute to "authority" within regimes. Regimes that can
adjudicate and coerce, however, will have more authority (and auton-
omy) than those capable only of discussing, recommending, and
persuading. Moreover, the coercive power of SERs increases the diffi-
culty of studying and assessing other compliance pulls. For example, one
criticism of Franck's legitimacy model is that it cannot be isolated from
other authoritarian elements; however, Franck suggests that isolation is
144. See Downs, Enforcement, supra note 97, at 323 (noting coordination based agree-
ments, which do not suffer from mistrust as do Prisoners' Dilemma agreements, are easier to
achieve).
145. Ruggie, International Responses to Technology, supra note 12, at 579 (referencing
Max Weber's work entitled "Bureaucracy").
146. Id. at 581.
147. Id.
148. Id. (explaining that a sense of joint obligation may emerge when a regime furthers
the collective interests of member states and that as a result norms of compliance may
emerge). This theory of authority reflects constructivists' principles. See supra notes 57-67
and accompanying text.
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not a problem in the international arena because the international arena
lacks a coercive element. 49 However, SERs provide a coercive element
and render legitimacy research more elusive. Finally, because states are
affected by their interactions with other states, the dominance and effec-
tiveness of SERs will draw states toward greater assimilation, thus
contributing to greater SER autonomy.5 0
Some regimes are more likely to gravitate toward SER status. Trad-
ing regimes, for instance, are most likely to become self-enforcing
because they control an effective retorsion: the denial of trade prefer-
ences. Coercion rests upon the ability of one nation to impose sanctions
upon another. Although military sanctions are undesirable for obvious
reasons, reputational or diplomatic sanctions may prove effective in
some cases.'' Economic sanctions, too, have great potential to induce
compliance. Imposing economic sanctions, however, is feasible only
when the imposing nation controls something of value such as foreign
aid or a preferential tariff rate with a market for goods. Trading regimes
control preferential tariff rates and the movement of goods in general.
Other regimes cannot use tariff or trade preferences to coerce behavior
without violating trade regime norms. Thus, trading regimes can easily
become self-enforcing while, conversely, other regimes will have diffi-
culty in doing so because they do not possess easy access to economic
sanctions.'52
Andrea Kupfer Schneider has charted the various enforcement levels
and methods in trade dispute settlement mechanisms. She notes that
trading regimes recently evolved into a system of dispute settlement
more akin to a domestic court in that they are able to "remedy harm and
[are] also narrowly tailored to punish each particular violation."'5 3 "Ne-
gotiation Regimes," which rely upon consultation and diplomacy, are the
least effective compliance regimes within the trading system as they rely
upon first-order compliance.5 4 "Investment Arbitration" regimes rely
149. See Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, supra note 97, at 710.
150. See infra Part IV. The social institutionalist agenda also supports this hypothesis.
See Finnemore, Sociology's Institutionalism, supra note 75, at 338-339 (positing that empiri-
cal expectations stemming from sociological institutionalism "would be for continuing and
even increasing adherence to multilaterialism-even when it runs contrary to expressed na-
tional interests-because it embodies some set of values central to the larger world culture").
151. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
152. GATT, supra note 4, art. XXI(c). This is not to say that economic sanctions are not
used to promote non-trade values; rather GATT/WTO allows for an exception to its rules for
members to comply with United Nations obligations. Id.
153. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Re-
gimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697, 712 (1999) (evaluating
various dispute settlement regimes and how their decisions affect formation of international
law).
154. See id. at 703-04, 713-14 (evaluating judicialization of negotiation model).
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upon the enforcement of domestic courts. 5 5 The "International Adjudica-
tion" regime provides "supremacy under international law, transparency
of decisions, and, increasingly, a wider range of remedies ... and en-
forcement that is limited to international law."' 5 6 The "Supranational
Court" regime gives the greatest level of enforcement and access by
"providing direct effect, standing for private actors, supremacy, transpar-
ency, and enforcement with strong remedies.' 57
The WTO exemplifies an SER and would be characterized as an "In-
ternational Adjudication" regime under Schneider's model.' 8 Under the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), 59 nations agree to
submit disputes to a WTO panel should consultations between the parties
fail. The panel applies regime rules and an Appellate Body ("AB") re-
views legal appeals from the panel's decision. The losing party has a
limited period of time to comply with the decision. '6 Although the DSU
explicitly states that compliance is preferred,' 6' the losing party's failure
to comply may afford the winning party the ability to institute sanctions
by means of retaliatory tariffs. 62 Thus, the system possesses "automatic-
ity," not only because the decision is recognized as international law, but
155. See id. at 703-04, 718.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 704.
158. Id. at 719. Other trading regimes have similar dispute systems. Chapter 20 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, provides for consultation,
commission intervention and arbitration before a five-member panel. NAFTA, supra note 15,
at arts. 2003, 2006-2007. The arbitration report is due within a reasonable time, usually 120
days of the request for arbitration and there is no review mechanism for the report. NAFTA,
supra note 15, at art. 2017. The arbitration report is not "binding" in the sense that the losing
party has to comply; however, the process is self-enforcing to the extent that if the losing party
does not come into compliance the winning side may take retaliatory action to obtain compen-
sation. NAFTA, supra note 15, at art. 2019. NAFTA parties have the option of referring a
dispute to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Environmental, certain health and safety,
and product standard disputes may not be referred to the WTO if the responding party objects.
See generally R. FOLSOM & W.D. FOLSOM, UNDERSTANDING NAFTA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS ch. 5 (1996).
159. DSU, supra note 9.
160. Id. art. 21(3).
161. Id. art. 21(i). Commentators disagree on whether compliance with WTO decisions
is required or merely preferred. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 60-63
(1997) [hereinafter Jackson, Understanding-Misunderstandings] (arguing that the DSU report
represents international law, not a choice to comply or pay damages). But see Judith Hipler
Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416
(1996) [hereinafter Bello](arguing that DSU reports are not binding and rely upon voluntary
compliance). In other words, some argue that a nation has the option of complying or simply
paying the cost of non-compliance. The view that the WTO only requires that a nation pay the
cost of non-compliance would seem to preserve the normative feedback loop and prevent the
creation of a "democratic deficit."
162. DSU, supra note 9, art. 22.
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also the availability of sanctions or retaliation without resort to the norm-
ative feedback loop promotes compliance.'63
The WTO also retains traditional compliance factors to aid enforce-
ment. Applying the legitimacy model of compliance, for example, the
WTO promotes compliance through the use of determinate, clear rules.'(,
Clear rules encourage "gratification deferral"' 65 whereby members obey
a regime rule notwithstanding harm to their short-term interests because,
as a useful rule, it will likely benefit their long-term interests.' 66 Other
traditional compliance factors also exist within the WTO.'
67
An SER possesses the ability to promote its values more often than a
non-SER. The WTO, for example, promotes trade values through its dis-
pute settlement mechanism. Richard Shell provides a comprehensive
explanation of the potential legal models of the WTO regime, explaining
their normative foundations and viewing the WTO normative implica-
tions through three different models: the "regime management model,"
the "efficient market model," and the "trade stakeholders model." 68 As
for the regime management model:
Legalists favoring the Regime Management Model see the WTO
legal system as a means to generate legitimate normative stan-
dards around which states will bargain with one another to gain
wealth through more open trade while retaining the control they
need to achieve the domestic political objectives that call for
limiting trade. 161
Proponents of the efficient market model seek to minimize govern-
ment interference and give businesses direct access to international trade
163. See Jackson, Understanding-Misunderstandings, supra note 161, at 63; see also
Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate, supra note 84, at 175-77 (noting the DSU's
"automaticity" as one of the triggers in the sovereignty debate). Under the prior GAT regime,
sanctions could be authorized, but rarely were. See BHALA, supra note 82, at 200.
164. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, supra note 97, at 713. As Franck
points out, clarity should not be confused with simplicity. Id. at 721.
165. Id. at 716.
166. Id. (explaining that a rule's legitimacy increases with its clarity because clear rules
encourage actors to defer the short term gains of non-compliance in favor of long term gains
resulting from clear obligations). Consider also Franck's discussion of the GATF's coherence
through the Adoption of a Generalized System of Preferences to give integrity to the preferen-
tial treatment afforded to lesser-developed nations, in view of the GATT national treatment
rule. Id. at 750.
167. See, e.g., Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement Annex
3, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31 (1994). The WTO pro-
motes the compliance factor of discourse not only by means of the panel proceedings (which
now occur in a timely fashion), but also through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
("TPRM") and various committees. Id.
168. See Shell, supra note 31, at 858-94, 907-27.
169. Id. at 835-38.
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dispute resolution.7' But as Shell points out, either model of interna-
tional trade seeks to promote trade values such as economic efficiency
and comparative advantage over different values from other regimes. '
Shell proposes a trade stakeholders model, which would incorporate
fairness and justice values. 172 Notably, the underlying values of an SER
are reinforced to a greater extent than a non-SER because of the SER's
efficacy. Thus, if the WTO truly operates on an efficiency model, the
presence of efficiency values in international discourse increases as the
WTO achieves greater authority.
Criticism exists for the characterization of the WTO as a "self-
enforcing" regime. Arguably, the WTO is not self-enforcing; rather, it
merely allows for economic retaliation automatically once a complaint
has been brought to it and resolved by it. 73 As some commentators note,
these regimes are "legalized"' 1 4 such that they contain rules and dispute
settlement mechanisms, may issue binding decisions and are capable of
imposing a cost for non-compliance. However, the regime has no army,
no jail, and no means to compel enforcement.' 75 Although the WTO can-
not "make" Country X rescind its protection of the Tibetan Antelope, the
WTO can penalize it for the harm that its protection causes Country Y
170. See id. at 837.
171. See id.
172. Id.
This model emphasizes broader participation in trade adjudication, democratic
processes for resolving trade conflict, and open dialogue regarding the goals of
economic trade. Like the Efficient Market Model, the Trade Stakeholders Model is
based on liberalism's insight that individuals, not states, should be the primary sub-
jects of international law. Unlike the Efficient Market Model, the Trade
Stakeholders Model sees trade legalism as an opportunity for domestic and transna-
tional interest groups of all kinds, non-business as well as business, to participate
with nations in the activity of constructing common economic and social norms that
will make global trade a sustainable aspect of a larger transnational society.
Id. Even the trade stakeholders model, however, will promote trade values and norms at the
outset.
173. See Bello, supra note 161, at 418 (noting that in a dispute settlement ruling against
a member of the WTO, it "may choose to comply, to compensate, or to stonewall and suffer
retaliation against its exports").
174. See, e.g. Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood, New Generation, supra note 19, at 370
("Further, much institutionalized cooperation has taken an increasingly 'legalized,' 'judicial-
ized' or constitutional form.... [lI]nternational regimes, from the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to the World Bank, depend
increasingly on legal dispute mechanisms."). Id.
175. Bello, supra note 161, at 417. "When a panel established under the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding issues a ruling adverse to a member, there is no prospect of incar-
ceration, injunctive relief, damages for harm inflicted or police enforcement." Id. "The WTO
has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas." Id. See also
Robert 0. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolu-
tion: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT'L ORG. 457, 466-67 (2000)[hereinafter Keohane,
Moravcsik & Slaughter].
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Arguably, Country X retains the power to violate the WTO rules and
protect the Tibetan Antelope. The WTO, however, quantifies and collects
a cost of non-compliance like a traffic summons "enforces" traffic laws.
Although a driver may choose to disregard the law, a cost is nonetheless
imposed and collected. Thus, the additional costs promote a higher level
of compliance and move the regime toward self-enforcement without
armies or jails.
NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes provide an example of the effect of the
cost of non-compliance with SERs. Although NAFTA incorporates
environmental values,'76 parts of the treaty threaten them. Under
NAFTA's Chapter 11, investors of member nations are entitled to both
protection of their property and compensation !for any expropriation,
which may constitute a "regulatory taking." A foreign investor may
claim the existence of an expropriation and seek arbitration under the
World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) Additional Facility,'77 or the arbitral rules of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).' s If a party re-
fuses to comply with an award, a Chapter 20 dispute settlement
proceeding may govern the matter upon referral. 
79
NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions gave rise to a case of regime compe-
tition in the 1998 dispute involving S.D. Myers, Inc. and S.D. Myers
(Canada), Inc. s° The companies claimed that Canada expropriated their
property by banning exports of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) wastes
from Canada. S.D. Myers (Canada), Inc. could no longer ship its waste
products to its related treatment facility in Ohio as it had done in the
past. Canada banned the exports in order to comply with its obligations
under both the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, and a bilateral
agreement with the United States concerning Hazardous Waste.'8 ' S.D.
Meyers attempted to demonstrate unfair treatment and that, as a result, it
was entitled to compensation for the Chapter 11 expropriation. The panel
176. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
177. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Conven-
tion]. See ICSID, Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration, and
Fact-Finding Proceedings, Doc. ICSID/I 1 (1979) (mandating use when either host govern-
ment or government of foreign investor is not party to the ICSID).
178. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No.
39, at 182, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976), at http://uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/arb-
rules.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
179. NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 1136(5).
180. See David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental Protection and Investor Rights un-
der Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10646 (2001) (discussing this




agreed, illustrating the strength of an SER despite the presence of a
widely recognized and accepted environmental treaty.
The claim that some regimes self-enforce is arguably untrue because
nations are free to leave SERs, and therefore no coercive power exists.
Although the choice of whether to comply notwithstanding automatic
sanctions remains with the state actor, the sanctions directly modify that
actor's rational analysis. 82 And while nations may withdraw from an
SER in order to avoid the cost of non-compliance, withdrawal from cer-
tain types of regimes may impose other significant costs. If, for example,
the WTO operates on a game theory model, the consequences of exit are
prevalent. 8 3 The evolution of the regime and its increased efficacy raises
the costs of defection for any one player. Where that cost becomes pro-
hibitive, the regime is undeniably self-enforcing.
SERs may also progress to the point where they represent public in-
terests. Commentators argue that institutions can reflect public values.',
Kenneth Abbott argues that GATT, for example, during the Uruguay
rounds leading to the formation of the WTO, possessed several charac-
teristics of a public interest community, one of which was an
independent vision for the common good.'85 Public interest institutions
182. One can see this behavior modification in the emergence of seat belt legislation.
The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration reports that:
while the first seat belts were installed . . . in the 1950s, seat belt use was ... only
10 to 15 percent nationwide.... From 1984 through 1987, belt use increased from
14 percent to 42 percent, as a result of the passage of seat belt use laws in 31 States.
From 1990 through 1992, belt use increased from 49 percent to 62 percent, as a re-
sult of a national effort of highly visible enforcement and public education.
The Presidential Initiative for Increasing Seat Belt Use Nationwide, 1st Cong. Rep. (Jan.
1998) (the House and Senate Appropriations Committees requested biannual reports from the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration), at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./people/injury/
airbags/buckleplan/presbelt2/ (last visited July 9, 2001).
183. See generally ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 98-105 (1970) (dis-
cussing exit, loyalty and public goods); Aceves, supra note 33, at 247 (explaining that nations
are not likely to risk losing their investment in a regime). See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note
16, at 437 (explaining how enmeshment makes it difficult for nations to withdraw from re-
gimes). Indeed, sometimes there exists no real choice whether to enter the regime, either. As
John Jackson pointed out, while countries like the United States and the E.U. engaged in de-
bate over whether to join the WTO for months, smaller countries like Costa Rica debated less
than an hour. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate, supra note 84, at 167 ("To stay out
of the new trade system could put whole economies in jeopardy, give up 'rule based' leverage
that the new procedures might afford small nations, and prevent participation in the develop-
ment of new rules, as well as the elaboration and interpretation of the extensive U.R. [Uruguay
Round] texts.").
184. Christina R. Sevilla, Explaining Patterns of GATTIWTO Trade Complaints, CO-
LUMBIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ONLINE WORKING PAPERS (Jan. 1998) (suggesting systemic
complaints in the WTO take on the character of a public good for the signatories), at
http://www.columbia.edu/dlc/ciao/wps/secOl/ [hereinafter Sevilla].
185. Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond,
18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31, 33 (1992) (arguing "that GATT is, or is becoming, a public institu-
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move beyond the private interests of the individual members and gener-
ate norms that promote the good of the institutions, in addition to norms
that resolve disputes among the parties.
Thus, SERs discount the normative feedback loop and elevate them-
selves as a new form of international authority. SERs may enforce their
values and norms with limited direct input from state actors and their
constituencies. The existence of SERs creates a chilling effect on non-
compliance with regime rules and values. 8 6 Admittedly, the normative
feedback loop still exists, but SERs increase the cost of using it in a
manner inconsistent with SER values. Cost, however, is relevant and, at
some point, cost may become prohibitive. At that point, it seems irrele-
vant whether one labels a regime "self-enforcing" or not.
B. The Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop
The devaluation of the normative feedback loop reorders regime hi-
erarchies with SERs at the top, and creates collateral effects on regime
functioning. This reordering results from four factors: (1) SERs are often
capable of enforcing norms and benefiting from repeated compliance;
(2) an increased number of disputes brought to SERs provide more en-
forcement opportunities and strengthens their legitimacy; (3) SERs are a
forum for inter-regime conflicts; and (4) continued iteration of the SERs'
norms leads to greater domestic internalization. There will also be two
collateral effects: (1) SERs will increasingly become capture targets, and
(2) support for the values that arise from a rule-based system.
First, SERs will be able to enforce their own values. SERs automati-
cally impose a cost upon non-compliance with limited reliance upon
individual regime members. In the WTO Shrimp-Turtle dispute, 87 for
example, the United States violated GATT Article XI's prohibition on
import bans.' 8  Although the United States legitimately sought to protect
turtles by differentiating between shrimp caught with Turtle Excluder
tion with public functions"). Abbott, for example, noted that the Contracting Parties were
"broadly empowered to take decisions necessary to further the objectives of the General
Agreement, Article XXV: 1." Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note
143, at 116 n.28.
186. Logically it seems that issues involving national security would be an exception to
the notion that SERs will have the power to trump most other regimes. See Abbott & Snidal,
supra note 16, at 440 (explaining that because sovereignty costs are high in areas concerning
national security, actors will prefer "soft law" where national security is implicated). Transna-
tional politics likely plays a role as well. See, e.g., Keohane, Moravcsik, & Slaughter, supra
note 175, at 473 (discussing the E.U.'s potential WTO objection to the United States' Helms-
Burton legislation affecting trade with Cuba and the negotiated agreement reached despite the
apparent violation of WTO norms).
187. Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 131; Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 132.
188. GAT, supra note 4, art. XI.
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Devices ("TEDs") and those caught without TEDs, the WTO found that
the United States violated the trading regime rules. Although the United
States subsequently brought its legislation into compliance, its failure to
do so would have allowed affected nations to seek compensation from
the United States for the cost of the ban. 89
The dispute between Country X and Country Y presents a similar di-
lemma. Although Country X has obligations under both WTO and
CITES, the WTO allows Country Y to retaliate against Country X for the
breach of WTO obligations' 90 If Country X fails to bring its laws into
conformity with its WTO obligations, Country Y can seek compensation
or retaliation. 9' The WTO supersedes CITES because of Country Y's
ability to utilize WTO sanctions automatically to protect its trading
rights.
Although somewhat unpersuasive in the SER context, questions
concerning the effectiveness of sanctions to enforce norms exist.' Sanc-
tions are often ineffective because of a weak political will to impose
them and a lack of uniform application. Both of these problems, how-
ever, arise from the operation of the normative feedback loop. SERs are
immune from such deficiencies. Indeed, SERs are desirable because
they provide more stabilized, predictable, and legalized forums than
non-SERs. The Shrimp-Turtle dispute stands in stark contrast to the
Tuna-Dolphin dispute under GATT,'93 where the United States blocked the
panel decisions holding it had violated its GATT obligations."'9 Perhaps
189. See DSU, supra note 9, art. 22. Compensation could have exceeded $200 million
dollars per year. Press Release, Sea Turtles Restoration Project, Environmentalists Blast Inter-
national Trade Panel Decision Which Places Sea Turtles and U.S. Endangered Species Act At
Risk (Mar. 19, 1998) (citing the National Fisheries Institute), at http://www.seaturtles.org/
press_release2.cfm?presslD=20. National Fisheries Institute, a fisheries industry trade organi-
zation, estimated the cost of the ban at $200 to 500 million annually. Id.; see also Legal Briefs,
MARINE TURTLE NEWSL. 76 (Sea Turtles Restoration Project), 1997, at 25-30, at
http://www.seaturtle.org/mtn/archives/mtn76/mtn76p25.shtml.
190. See DSU, supra note 9, art. 22. The WTO envisions that Country X will withdraw
its offending legislation. If it does not withdraw it, the parties will attempt to agree upon com-
pensation. If they cannot agree, Country Y will be able to retaliate. Id.
191. See id.
192. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 109, at 2-3, 31-33. Chayes & Chayes explain the
problems with sanctions, such as slow results that may not be "particularly conducive to
changing behavior" Id. at 2. They further note the high amount of political effort needed to
sustain such efforts. Id. Also, they observe, "efforts to impose sanctions will be intermittent
and ad hoc" because of the high political costs. Id. As a result, "sanctioning authority is rarely
granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used." Id. at 32-
33.
193. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (noting nations could nevertheless
choose non-compliance, as the E.U. did in the Beef Hormone Dispute). The cost of non-
compliance will, however, be substantial. Non-compliance in the face of such enforcement
may serve to strengthen the outer regime values in the long run. One could argue that the
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the United States would have complied with the Shrimp-Turtle decision
even without the threat of retaliation. United States past practice, how-
ever, specifically in the Tuna-Dolphin controversy, suggests otherwise.
Second, SERs will likely entertain more disputes than non-SERs.' 95
Under the GATT system (a non-SER), for example, actors who lacked
the capacity to secure compliance with their trade rights may have for-
gone the option of pressing disputes before the regime. Instead, the
nation might have chosen to negotiate a solution or simply not initiate a
dispute. 96 Under the WTO system, developed and developing nations
take advantage of the dispute settlement mechanism. Increased participa-
tion appears to be a desirable advancement of SERs, but is not without
collateral consequences.
Even the managerial model of compliance, which eschews sanc-
tions, 197 demonstrates how the increased number of disputes within SERs
will promote compliance with regime values through discourse and the
iterative process.9' SERs encourage a greater level of discourse by em-
ploying an accessible adjudicatory rule-based system.
Third, SERs will offer a forum for balancing multiple non-SER in-
terests. SERs will not only be able to impose their rules without resort to
the normative feedback loop, but also balance outer regime interests with
their own. States may view SERs as an attractive forum. Actors may pur-
sue the logic of consequences to seek the best result for their investment,
Europeans have done just that in the Beef Hormone dispute. See Paul Ames, EU Undeterred
by U.S. Threats, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, July 20, 1999, at 1999 WL 22024171; Keith B.
Richburg, French Farmer Protested U.S. Dominance, Bad Food Activist Gets Jail in McDon-
ald's Raid, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at 36, 2000 WL 6694708. Perhaps it is
nonetheless advantageous to a wealthy nation to breach and pay damages rather than comply
with the trade rule or norm. Whether breach is a legitimate option has been the subject of
some debate. See Jackson, Understanding-Misunderstandings, supra note 161, at 60-63 (argu-
ing that an adopted DSU report represents international law, not a choice to comply or pay
damages); Bello, supra note 161 (arguing DSU reports are not binding and rely upon volun-
tary compliance).
195. See Sevilla, supra note 184, at 15 (noting the increase in the number of GATT com-
plaints).
196. Cf JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109-12 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM] (suggesting that a rule based system may give smaller countries a fairer
break than a diplomacy based system); Ronald A. Brand, Competing Philosophies of GATT
Dispute Resolution in the Oilseeds Case and the Draft Understanding on Dispute Settlement,
J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1993, at 117, 119-22, 126-35; Sevilla, supra note 184, at 21 (noting
rise in complaints by lesser developed nations in the WTO). See also Michael K. Young, Dis-
pute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389,
396-406 (1995)[hereinafter Young] (explaining shift from a power-oriented to rule oriented
approach in international trade).
197. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
198. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 109, at 25.
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rather than logic of appropriateness, which seeks the most just or fair
result.199
Fourth, greater SER discourse and enforcement will inevitably lead
to a higher rate of norm internalization. 2' The modified constructivist
approach, consistent with the constructivist and transnational legal proc-
ess schools, suggests that repeated interactions in the international arena
lead to the domestic internalization of norms .2 Internalization alters the
identities and interests of the state actors in a manner that increases in-
vestment in the SERs. Thus SERs will likely provide a high level of
enforcement and compliance, while increasing discourse and thereby
promoting greater norm internalization.
Collateral effects, although generally beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, are noteworthy. First, if a regime is an SER, then the group that
captures that SER will distort regime functioning. The logical result of
the possibility that SERs will increase in dominance exponentially is that
rent-seekers will realize the greatest opportunity for return on their in-
vestment in those regimes.202 Second, although a self-enforcing
adjudicatory system accentuates the norms of that system, collateral
norms are nonetheless promoted. Arguably, a rule-based system pro-
motes fairness and equality for nations that lack the power from a realist
perspective to enforce norms that inure to their benefit.203 The promotion
by rule-based systems of predictability and stability as values multiplies
in the presence of a self-enforcing regime.20 Finally, although SERs may
independently impose costs upon non-compliance, the rules of the SERs
limit those costs. Previously, unilateral retaliation was subject only to the
capabilities and discretion of the sanction-imposing nation 205 The
199. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 5-6 (1999).
Krasner discusses how the logics of consequences, which "see political actions and outcomes,
including institutions, as the product of rational calculating behavior designed to maximize a
given set of unexplained preferences," dominate the logic of appropriateness. Id. Appropriate-
ness "understand[s] political action as a product of rules, roles, and identities that stipulate
appropriate behavior in given situations" in the international environment. Id.
200. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
201. See Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 41, at 642-54 (explaining
how norm internalization works).
202. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 31, at 848 (positing that developing countries favor the
more legalistic system as it improves their ability to negotiate with wealthier nations).
204. See id. at 833-34 (recounting the debate between trade legalists and trade pragma-
tists). See also Young, supra note 196, at 396-406 (discussing the shift from a diplomacy
approach to a rule based approach in the WTO).
205. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, National Sovereignty in the World Trading System,
23 HARV. INT'L REV., Issue 4 (January 1, 2001) (explaining that United States retaliation in
the E.U. Beef Hormone dispute is limited under the current WTO rules). See supra note 84
(discussing Section 301).
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development of a multilateral rule-based system is one of the many posi-
tive attributes of emerging SERs.2°
As previously stated, the purpose of this article is not to decry the
emergence of SERs; it is to articulate some of the collateral effects that
SERs have on international and national value and identity formation.
The emergence of SERs will change the contribution of the normative
feedback loop as well as its resulting norm hierarchies. The ability of
SERs to discount the normative feedback loop will result in their domi-
nation of other regimes.27 New hierarchies will emerge and non-SERs
will resort to new means of reasserting and reconstructing their values
within these hierarchies.
C. Normative Feedback Loop Remnants
Although their influence may fade, the norms and values of non-
SERs will continue to exist and persuade primarily through their exis-
tence as separate regimes. Also, SERs may occasionally accommodate
non-SER values through exceptions. And, although SERs may marginal-
ize certain values, the prevalence and power of these regimes make it
208possible for them to reincorporate those values. Nevertheless, it re-
mains clear that because SERs operate with set default rules, exceptions
or incorporation attempts will take place in a biased setting.
Despite their lack of power to enforce norms, non-SERs hold a per-
suasive effect on the development of international law. 2°9 The persuasive
206. Perhaps the dilution of the normative feedback loop is a good thing. Its existence
permitted the ad hoc unilateralism of hegemonic states such as the United States to dominate
world policy. Perhaps as we move beyond hegemony the normative feedback loop becomes
less important. Subjecting regimes to the normative feedback loop undermined their stability
and predictability. If regimes seek to promote stability and predictability, perhaps the dilution
of the normative feedback loop is a welcomed event.
207. Cf. Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 16 (noting nations
will bargain away certain preferences where community norms lack means to prevent it).
208. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 31, at 907-25 (recommending that a trade stakeholder
model, based upon notions of civic republicanism, should be adopted to allow for more di-
verse participation within the trade regime to account for non-trade values). Shell attributes his
adoption of civic republicanism to Mark Seidenfeld. See id. at 913-14 discussing Mark Sei-
denfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1512
(1992).
209. See Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 98, at 194 (arguing "transna-
tional legal process" enforces international law). Harold Koh explained compliance in the
absence of strict enforcement:
Just because the 55 mph speed limit is not strictly enforced does not mean that that
law lacks all power. When the speed limit is 55, people tend to drive 65, not 85. The
law may be underenforced, it may be imperfectly enforced, but it is enforced, not
by a simple domestic process of legislation, adjudication, and executive action, but
by a process of complex enforcement that transpires in a variety of public and pri-
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effect that non-SERs retain through the traditional compliance factors
may, however, diminish when a nation fails to comply with a non-SER
norm in order to avoid SER sanctions or enforcement. Arguably, Country
X damages its reputation less by failing to comply with its CITES obli-
gations in the presence of threatened WTO retaliation, rather than in the
absence of a separate enforcement mechanism. Whether the strengthen-
ing of SER values diminishes the pressure to comply with non-SER
values remains questionable. The strength of the WTO's compliance pull
relative to the compliance pull of CITES may essentially make the latter
seem less compelling. Alternatively, perhaps the strength of SERs may
engender support for international institutions in general, thus strength-
ening the compliance pull of non-SERs. Although these questions await
empirical testing, logic suggests that SER compliance threatens to over-
shadow traditional compliance factors that support non-SERs.
The NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute involving S.D. Myers, Inc. and
Canada's attempt to comply with the Basel Convention illustrates com-
pliance problems non-SERs face in an SER world. Although, as a widely
recognized environmental convention explicitly mentioned by NAFTA,
the Basel Convention has significant compliance pull, Canada faced sig-
nificant economic consequences for its Chapter 11 violation. 0 Although
a rational proposition, only speculation provides an answer to the ques-
tion of whether the S.D. Myers dispute will have a chilling effect on
Canada's future environmental agenda. The allowance of exceptions
within SERs represents one possible way to strengthen the normative
feedback loop. Exceptions recognize that, under specific circumstances,
SER values may appropriately bow to the values of another regime. The
exceptions found in Article XX... of GATT/WTO should not be confused
with affirmative assertions of non-trade values. For example, although
Article XX contains an exception for prison labor (countries may restrict
the importation of goods made with prison labor), the GATT contains no
vate fora, under a variety of domestic and international laws, triggered by a variety
of governmental and nongovernmental actors.
Id.
210. See NAFIA, supra note 15, art. 104.
211. See GAr, supra note 4, art. XX. GATI7/WTO has also addressed environmental is-
sues indirectly through the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
(relating to human, animal and plant health and safety in agriculture) and the Technical Barri-
ers to Trade (TBT) (relating to technical standards and regulations). Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement Annex
IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOI. 1 (1994); Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOl. 1(1994).
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affirmative ban on prison labor.22 Likewise, Article XX provides envi-
ronmental exceptions, which may allow Country X to claim that its
protection of the Tibetan Antelope is permitted, even if otherwise incon-
sistent with GATT/WTO. Country X, however, will face the burden of
showing that its action promotes a valid environmental goal and repre-
sents the least restrictive measure available. "Exceptions", therefore,
cannot adequately take the place of the normative feedback loop.
Through the Article XX exceptions, environmental values have nev-
ertheless gained recognition in the GATTIWTO regime. The documented
evolution of the environmental values within the Tuna-Dolphin contro-
versy" 3 indicates that the first Tuna-Dolphin panel rejected the assertion
that the United States could protect dolphins outside its borders. Accord-
ing to one commentator, however, the second Tuna-Dolphin panel used a
narrower ground upon which to base its decision:
The second panel's shift to a narrower ground of decision that
held out a theoretical possibility of cross-border environmental
regulation, even as it struck down the embargo provisions of the
[Marine Mammal Protection Act] MMPA, served to enhance
overall regime stability by asking for less political commitment
from its regime members as the price of regime membership.24
The above discussion demonstrates at least an attempt by the GATT
to accommodate non-trade values.2" Arguably, the WTO AB's recent As-
bestos Report216 signals a greater commitment to non-trade values by
way of Article XX exceptions . The Asbestos case represents the first
time a panel, and subsequently the AB, permitted a ban on imported
212. See GATI', supra note 4, art. XX. Indeed, some experts have suggested the trading
regime is not the place to enforce non-trade values. See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-
Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Devel-
opment, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 239 n.45 (1997) [hereinafter Steinberg] (citing confidential
interview with member of WTO Secretariat).
213. See generally Shell, supra note 31, at 872-77 (discussing Tuna-Dolphin dispute).
214. Id. at 877.
215. But see Cameron and Gray, supra note 132, at 265 (discussing relationship between
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and GATT in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute,
where the Panel held that MEA not concluded by the parties was irrelevant for GATT
interpretation).
216. See generally WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS 135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), at
23, 57-66, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/distab-e.htm [hereinafter Asbestos
AB]; WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, V/T/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), at 432-50, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu -e/distab-e.htm [hereinafter Asbestos Report].
217. See Elizabeth Olsen, Environmentalists Applaud a WTO. Ruling on Asbestos, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2000, at C4; Press Release, Greenpeace International, NGOs Welcome WTO
Greenlight to French Ban on Asbestos But Remain Skeptical About WTO Dispute Settlement
Process (March 14, 2001), at www.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/toxcics/2001 marl4.html.
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goods pursuant to Article XX(b).2 8 In the Asbestos Dispute, the AB ruled
that a French decree prohibiting the importation of white asbestos from
Canada because of health concerns was "necessary to protect human...
life or health" under Article XX(b).219 The AB further found that the de-
cree did not violate "national treatment" because the Canadian chrysotile
asbestos fibers and the asbestos-substitute products used in France were
not "like products" under Article 111:4.220 The AB determined that it was
permissible to account for health risk factors when resolving whether
two products were "like. 22' In this case, the AB ruled that the health risk
of asbestos is part of the inquiry because "carcinogenicity, or toxicity,
constitutes ... a defining aspect of the physical properties of chrysotile
asbestos fibers. 2 22 Arguably, the extreme nature of the Asbestos dispute
eased the panel's and AB's decisions to bow to non-trade values 223 Nev-
ertheless, the AB could have reached the same result without the like
product analysis. 224 Because the AB could simply have relied on the
XX(b) exception, the WTO arguably permitted health values to trump
trade values.
NAFTA includes several provisions that operate as exceptions to its
trade-based rules.2 ' The agreement includes language to conditionally
protect strict environmental health and safety standards to avoid viewing
them as trade barriers inconsistent with NAFTA. 26 NAFTA places the
burden of proof on the party challenging an environmental standard as
inconsistent with the treaty.227 In the presence of inconsistency, NAFTA
specifically bows to the values articulated in the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their
218. See Julie Paltrowitz, Note, A "Greening" of The World Trade Organization? A Case
Comment on The Asbestos Report, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1789 (2001) [hereinafter Pal-
trowitz](offering complete history of attempts to use Article XX(b)). Other attempts to use
Article XX(b) of the GATT, though unsuccessful, include several disputes. See Shrimp-Turtle
Report, supra note 131; Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 132; Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 81;
Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 81. See also Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990).
219. Asbestos AB, supra note 216, at IV 158.
220. Id. at VI(D) 125, 131, 148.
221. Id. atVI(D) [ 113-114.
222. Id. at VI(D) 1 114 (emphasis in original).
223. See Paltrowitz, supra note 218, at 1830-31 (citing the uncontested dangers of As-
bestos).
224. See Asbestos Report, supra note 216. The Panel Report found in favor of the French
decree while finding that the products were "like products." Id. The AB Report found that the
toxic nature of the asbestos prevented it from being considered a "like product." See Asbestos
AB, supra note 216.
225. See NAFrA, supra note 15.
226. See id. arts. 712, 904.
227. See id. arts. 723(6), 914(4).
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Disposal, and CITES.228 Despite its specific inclusion, the Basel Conven-
tion did not appear to trump S.D. Myers Chapter 11 rights discussed
above.229
"Exceptions" within an SER remain an unattractive means for pro-
moting non-SER values. The amount of value integration can only be
incremental.3 Moreover, assuming norm creation is a balancing exer-
cise, the balancing mechanism undeniably influences the balancing
exercise. The balancing forum creates default rules to which it is predis-
posed.2 1' The availability and attractiveness of the forum will
simultaneously determine the likelihood of using the forum, and the re-
currence of its default rules. Exceptions are indeed an unattractive
mechanism because the regime will influence the balancing of interest so
as to favor SER values. The number of disputes heard in any regime in-
creases as the regime becomes self-enforcing. 232 The number of disputes
analyzing these exceptions will therefore likely increase and the iterative
process will further affect the strength of non-SER values.
In recognition of SER strength, some call for the inclusion of other
regime values within the SERs through "side agreements. 233 SERs tempt
parties to include non-regime agreements for a variety of reasons. First,
"[tjhe clustering of numerous related issues under a single regime ...
facilitates side payments: 'more potential quids are available for the
quo.' ' 23 Second, the strength of SERs' compliance mechanisms make
them attractive forums for litigating disputes. Finally, proponents of non-
SER values hope to offset the strength of an SER by obtaining some lev-
erage within the SER, however peripheral.
228. See id. art. 104.
229. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
230. See Shell, supra note 31, at 910 (suggesting that the WTO can be used "as a base on
which to build a new, more inclusive institution .... [whereby] those seeking progress on
social and environmental values may seek incremental changes within the WTO structure to
broaden the base of participation and enrich the set of free trade and political norms now in
ascendance").
231. See generally Steinberg, supra note 212, at 240 (explaining that the WTO dispute
settlement process adjudicates trade-environment disputes to ascertain whether environmental
laws are trade friendly, not whether they are appropriate from an environmental standpoint).
232. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
233. See generally Wesley R. Smith, The NAFTA Debate, Part I: A Primer on Labor En-
vironmental, and Legal Issues, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER No.936 (Apr. 3,
1993), at http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/trade/bg936.html (last visited July
17,2001) [hereinafter Smith]; Jacqueline McFadyen, NAFTA Supplemental Agreements, in 98-
4 Working Paper Series (1998), at http://wwwl.raffa.comiie/catalog/wp/1998/98-4.htm (last
visited July 17, 2001) [hereinafter McFadyen](explaining that in response to the opposition
and criticism of NAFTA by labor organizers and environmentalists, the Clinton Administration
conditioned the approval of NAFTA on the negotiation of labor and environmental side
agreements). Thus, it seems that the NAFFA side agreements were the direct result of the
normative feedback loop.
234. Abbott, Modern International Relations, supra note 31, at 400.
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NAFTA provides for a self-enforcing dispute settlement regime
while simultaneously recognizing values outside the regime by providing
for two side accords: the North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
tion (NAALC) 235 and the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC).236 Indeed, the creation of NAFTA side agree-
ments was a direct result of the normative feedback loop.237 These
accords work through cooperative initiatives and consultation between
the three NAFTA parties to improve environment and labor conditions in
North America, and to mediate disputes that may arise because of im-
plementating NAFTA. The side accords, however, lack NAFTA's
enforcement strength.
The NAAEC's objectives include "avoiding the creation of trade dis-
tortions or new trade barriers, enhancing compliance with, and
enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations, and fostering envi-
ronmental protection and pollution prevention." '238 It created the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), comprised of a
Council, a Joint Advisory Committee, and an independent Secretariat, to
increase environmental cooperation among the parties by creating a fo-
rum to discuss environmental issues. 239 The side agreement also contains
a dispute enforcement mechanism for individuals and governments to
address a party's failure to enforce environmental laws. 40
The NAALC's objectives include "promoting 11 basic Labor Princi-
ples, promoting international cooperation in the labor arena, improving
working conditions and living standards, and ensuring the effective en-
forcement and transparent administration of labor laws." 1 It created the
Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC), which includes a Council of
Ministers and an international Secretariat, to further its goals and, like
the NAAEC, provides a dispute mechanism to settle cases where one
party alleges that another party is not enforcing its labor laws.242
235. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, opened for signature Sept. 8,
1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC].
236. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, opened for signature
Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter
NAAEC].
237. See generally McFayden, supra note 233 (discussing labor and environmental con-
cerns raised during the NAFTA negotiations).
238. Mary Tiemann, NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, Congres-
sional Research Service, (March 1, 2000), at http://www.cnie.org/nle/inter-29.htm. See
NAAEC, supra note 236, art. 1.
239. NAAEC, supra note 236, arts. 8, 10(l)(a).
240. Id. arts. 22-36.
241. Commission for Labor Cooperation, Comparative Guides to Labor and Employ-
ment Laws in North America: Labor Relations Law in North America, (2000), at
http://www.naalc.org/english/pdf/intro.pdf. See NAALC, supra note 235, art. 1.
242. NAALC, supra note 235, arts. 8, 27-47.
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Promoting effective enforcement of the labor laws primarily prevents the
exploitation of workers as a means of gaining a comparative advantage
or securing direct foreign investment.243 The NAALC also allows the use
of trade sanctions against a party that fails to effectively enforce its labor
laws. 244
Although both agreements provide dispute mechanisms to resolve
environmental and labor issues, a long process impedes the imposition of
fines or sanctions.245 Under either agreement, the amount of tariff retalia-
tion cannot exceed the benefit conferred by the preferential NAFTA tariff
rates. In addition, the commissions established by the agreements cannot
make new laws nor override existing laws. 46 Rather, they can only moni-
tor the laws passed by the parties, and a commission mandate may be
rendered meaningless through a lack of specificity. 4 ' Both of these ac-
cords are nevertheless helpful because they provide a forum for
consultations regarding labor and the environment, and an opportunity to
collect information, consult, and coordinate efforts. 248
The emergence of SERs changes the functioning of the normative
feedback loop under a modified constructivist framework. SERs dilute
the effectiveness of the normative feedback loop. Although remnants of
the normative feedback loop remain, a vacuum now replaces the role
constituency preferences played in influencing state actions and identi-
ties.
243. See BHALA, supra note 82, at 1570-71 (addressing benefits as well as concerns
about NAALC).
244. NAALC, supra note 235, art. 3(g).
245. NAAEC, supra note 236, art. 34; NAALC, supra note 235, art. 39.
246. NAAEC, supra note 236, art. 37; NAALC, supra note 235, art. 42.
247. Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter
and Duncan Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG 401, 414 (2000) (noting the
NAALC's standard of promoting labor rights grants a great deal of discretion to the affected
actors such that it is difficult to meaningfully assess compliance). This provision stands in
stark contrast to the directives within NAFTA to prevent the expropriation of investor property.
A proposed free trade agreement between the United States and Jordan is currently being
criticized in the United States Congress, because it contains language which would allow for
international dispute resolution of claims that either party does not enforce its labor or envi-
ronmental standards. See Rossella Brevetti, Gramm Vows to Block Jordan FTA Unless
Sovereignty Concerns Addressed, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1123, 1159 (July 19, 2001) (not-
ing Senator Phil Gramm called for an amendment to the Jordan FTA which would prohibit any
tribunal from interfering with United States law).
248. See NAAEC, supra note 236, arts. 13-14; NAALC, supra note 235, art. 21. See
also, Steinberg, supra note 212, at 249-51 (discussing successes of NAFrA's environmental
efforts); Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 26 (noting NAAEC
provides normative and institutional means to address environmental problems). Nevertheless,
the NAAEC did not have any relevance in the S.D. Myers dispute, which pitted investor rights
against environmental regulation. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE VALUE VACUUM
The modified constructivist theory demonstrates how SERs create a
value vacuum by discounting the normative feedback loop's role as arbi-
ter of inter-regime conflicts. Although weakening the normative
feedback loop may strengthen regime stability, it also restricts the ability
of national values to enter into the international arena and influence
norm/identity formation. From an institutionalist perspective, SERs will
likely dominate non-SERs. SERs will become greater capture targets
only to skew the formation of norms and values within SERs. The mix of
values for identity construction and subsequent norm internalization will
tilt toward SER values. 49 The pieces of the value vacuum culminate once
the skewed norm internalization process affects what remains of the
normative feedback loop. Domestic values will therefore mirror the in-
ternationally dominating values, namely the SERs' values. Possible
response mechanisms may compensate for displaced constituency pref-
erences. These mechanisms, however, will fall short of filling the
normative void created by SERs.
A. Modified Constructivist Implications of the Dilution
of the Normative Feedback Loop
Upon utilizing the principles of modified constructivism, some dele-
terious effects of emerging SERs arise. The constant assertion of
national preferences by constituents for whom the state acts as an agent
in international relations will diminish following the dilution of the nor-
mative feedback loop. The social construction of state identities through
interaction with other states in the international arena will skew due to
dominant SERs. As a result, a value vacuum arises whereby norms, pref-
erences, and values previously inserted into decision making and identity
formation are not included in the process to the extent they once were
included. Assuming that Country X's constituency prefers to protect the
Tibetan Antelope despite the competing norm of non-discriminatory
trade treatment, the potential for WTO imposed sanctions for non-
compliance may undermine Country X's essential desire. The WTO's
dominant institutional position will ultimately increase and, over time,
the WTO's dominant position will change the identities and preferences
of both Country X and Country Y
249. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
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An SER's increased efficiency leads to repetitious enforcement of
SER values, which has instrumentalist and normative consequences."'
Repetitive enforcement engenders greater SER legitimacy while depreci-
ating the non-SER norms.25' Greater legitimacy promotes internalization
of preferred (SER) norms within nations. States will thereafter adapt
their interest attainment strategies. The repetitious enforcement of SER
values transforms state identities, which offers states greater reason, in
addition to rationalist interests, to comply with SER norms.
The dilution of the normative feedback loop and the resulting domi-
nance of SER values may debilitate states' representations of
constituency interests in the international arena. Once a state enters an
SER and agrees to the operating rules or principles of the SER, then the
state's ability to consider the normative feedback loop decreases substan-
tially. The process could excise the normative feedback loop altogether.
22
SER rules may dictate an outcome that is not subject to alteration by ref-
erence to constituency preferences. Although states can reconsider
constituency interests by deciding to exit an SER, game theory indicates
that the nature of the SER and its ability to enforce its own rules make
departure expensive.2 3 The SER's dispute settlement mechanism specifi-
cally renders it more efficacious at providing benefits for repeat players;
players who exit the SER face a severe disadvantage.254
States may arguably reinforce constituency preferences by challeng-
ing SER values despite great costs. In the E.U. Beef Hormone Dispute,255
for example, the E.U. violated its WTO obligations by banning beef
grown with certain hormones. Despite being subject to millions of dol-
lars in retaliatory tariffs, the E.U. clung to its ban. Possibly, the E.U. did
so because its constituencies prefer public health values, despite substan-
tial costs and traditional compliance factors.256 The E.U. Beef Hormone
250. See Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 72, at 489-94 (explaining instrumentalist and
normative optics in which states use international law as an instrument to (i) attain interests
and (ii) express, develop and promote norms).
251. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
252. The discounting of the normative feedback loop in conflicting situations may even
affect its efficacy in non-conflictual situations. As value infiltration through domestic sources
becomes difficult, new sources like national and international NGOs arguably become more
relevant.
253. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
254. Perhaps no liberal agency deficit exists because a state's decision to enter an SER
reflects constituency preferences. Because SERs usually evolve, however, membership in an
SER may not reflect a constituency preference to forever relinquish all other values in favor of
SER values.
255. See WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WTIDS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/hormab.pdf.
256. See Julian Nundy, French Stage Big Mac Attack Farmers Protest Start of Tariffs,
USA TODAY, July 29, 1999, at 03B; Helene Cooper, U.S. Seeks $200 Million Sanction in EU
[Vol. 22:673
The Value Vacuum
dispute represents the normative feedback loop still at work. The exis-
tence of the SER (the WTO) arguably served to strengthen non-trade
values. The E.U. Beef Hormone dispute, alternatively, may exemplify a
proper balance between SER and non-SER values. Nations receive the
benefit of a rule-based and efficient trade regime where, in a unique or
extreme situation, democratic preferences may trump regime rules. It is
not clear, however, how many similar battles the WTO could endure be-
fore imploding. If every dispute pushed the regime's limits, the regime
might disintegrate.257 Nor is it clear that smaller countries could afford to
mount such a challenge.
Diplomatic instrumentalities also experience the cost of the norma-
tive feedback loop deficit. The ability of a nation to threaten action in
negotiations with other states lessens when an SER prohibits that threat.
For example, when the United States pressured Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan to stop high sea drift net fishing in the South Pacific, the coun-
tries complied with international standards in part due to United States
political pressure and the threat of trade sanctions. Where trade sanc
tions are effectively proscribed outside of the WTO, the threat of
sanctions diminishes significantly. This result may be welcomed in some
cases, but not others.
Another consequence of emerging SERs is that state values and
preferences will favor SER values as constituency interests gradually
shift to align with international preferences. This realignment occurs, in
part, as a result of internalization. Because states internalize norms from
the international arena,59 the dominant norms enforced on a regular basis
Beef Fight, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1999, at 2A. See also Gary G. Yerkey, Little Hope of U.S.,
EU Settling Dispute Over Beef Trade Any Time Soon, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 799, 817
(May 24, 2001) (noting United States imposed retaliatory tariffs worth $116.8 million a year
on European products in response to the E.U.'s failure to comply with a WTO ruling). Con-
stituencies may simply prefer the interest group affected by the measure, such as the farmers.
257. Arguably the threat SERs pose to sovereignty and to the model of embedded liber-
alism is so great that SERs may cause their own implosion. This event, however, is unlikely
because investment in these regimes is so great that exit may become nearly impossible. The
inability to exit SERs results from their evolution. Duncan Snidal explains that institutions
start off not constraining the state, but subsequently impose constraints. See Duncan Snidal,
Political Economy and International Institutions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 121, 127 (1996).
As constraint increases over time, the cost of exit increases as well. Thus, a regime, which was
not costly to exit, may evolve into one that is costly to exit.
258. Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 21-22.
259. See Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 41, at 626. Koh sees this in-
ternalization process as part of the key to understanding why nations obey international law.
Id. Koh distinguished between three types of internalization:
Social internalization occurs when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that
there is widespread general obedience to it. Political internalization occurs when
political elites accept an international norm, and adopt it as a matter of government
policy. Legal internalization occurs when an international norm is incorporated into
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become increasingly internalized. SER norms and values also reproduce
efficiencies and greater returns for states investing themselves in those
regimes. Regimes cause national value preferences to shift because indi-
viduals realign their investments to take advantage of the regime.'
6
Further, as states commit to enforcement of international norms they, in
turn, become constrained by those norms.26' Although international goals
may relate back to national interests, a greater investment by states into
international legal order causes international legal order, and the pre-
ferred SER values, to emerge as a national interest.262
SERs will move towards greater autonomy and authority as a result
of their increased efficacy.63 Where effective dispute settlement mecha-
nisms exist, states may arguably rely on them as alternatives to the
political process. 6 Moreover, institutions traditionally promote coopera-
the domestic legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation, legisla-
tive action, or some combination of the three.
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 100, at 2656-57.
260. See supra notes 71-72, 121 and accompanying text.
261. Shell, supra note 31, at 896 (noting that the efficient market model suggests that
"nations are losing control over economic matters to global market forces").
This phenomenon appears to be most apparent at present in regional trade regimes
such as the NAFrA and the EU. The governance structures of both the NAFTA and
the EU demonstrate that within these regional trade spheres states must yield large
areas of legal control to supranational tribunals and rules to accommodate the needs
of transnational business. Systems such as the New York Convention and the ICSID
demonstrate that these same economic forces are at work to achieve a similar result
at the global level.
Id. at 896 n.321.
262. See Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 72, at 495-96.
An implication sometimes drawn from instrumentalist argument is that more de-
manding international rules are likely to be more vulnerable than rules requiring
less extensive cooperation.... [Some] assume that states, being instrumentalists,
will break rules when it is advantageous to do so.... They fail to consider the pos-
sibility that demanding rules ... would alter participants' conceptions of their
interests.... International institutions may affect states' formulations of their own
interests. If interests become "endogenous" in this sense, institutions with demand-
ing rules could be less, rather than more, vulnerable to reneging, as the increasing
authority of the European Union would appear to suggest.
Id.
263. N.D. WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 8 (1996) (noting some
theorists in rationalist school would concur that institutions may progress toward a type of
world government).
264. An example is the GATr/WTO. Between 1948 and 1989 there were 207 complaints
filed (229 if one counts the cases with multiple complainants) in the GATT. ROBERT E.
HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT
SYSTEM, 296 tbl. 11.14 (1993). The staggering number of complaints brought in the WTO
(under its dispute settlement mechanism) within the past seven years dwarfs this number. See
WTO, Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes, at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop.e/dispuse/dispu.e.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2001) (summarizing complaints, active
cases, Appellate Body Reports, Panel Reports and settled or inactive cases).
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tion through efficiencies and increased payoffs in the absence of a gov-
ernmental structure. As SERs gain autonomy and authority, they evolve
into quasi-governmental structures. Although the effect of such quasi-
governmental structures on the traditional efficiency model (for both
SERs and non-SERs) is uncertain, it seems logical that SER efficiency
will increase.
Efficacy in one regime can impose costs in another.265 SERs operate
to promote their values without pareto superiority. The trading regime,
for example, imposes costs on non-trade regime values because when a
trade regime value, such as non-discrimination, conflicts with a non-
trade regime value, such as environmental protection, the trading regime
can impose a tax for non-compliance with its values. This tax is there-
fore added to the standard costs of compliance with the environmental
values -to the detriment of the environmental regime.266
Constituency preferences may be sacrificed when self-enforcing in-
stitutions increase efficiency. Arguably, a value vacuum may replace the
mechanism that once incorporated constituency preferences. 6 ' The vac-
uum is perhaps desirable in some cases. Indeed, state actors may join
institutions to avoid balancing competing norms in the face of political
pressure. Institutions allow politicians to avoid pressure from domestic
constituencies.268 Benedict Kingsbury has suggested that nations may
desire adverse institutional rulings to relieve them of domestic political
pressure.269 Kingsbury gives the example of the Reagan administration's
use of a GATT panel ruling to deflect pressure to reenact a law to protect
the United States printing industry.70 Perhaps the mechanisms that fill
this vacuum are less subject to capture or political pressure. Or, these
mechanisms may be subject to capture and pressure on a different,
and/or broader, level particularly by businesses.2 ' Throughout the world,
business and multinational firms "have begun to resemble states."272
265. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
266. The damaging effect that SERs may have on other regimes is compounded when
SERs are not inclusive. For example, the WTO's theoretical foundations sometimes exclude
parties affected by trade. Shell, supra note 31, at 908 (citing Lawrence Susskind & Connie
Ozawa, Negotiating More Effective International Environmental Agreements, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 142, 158-59 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict
Kingsbury eds., 1992)).
267. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 16, at 438 (noting that France and Canada
experienced dilution of autonomous cultural policies as a result of NAFTA and WTO).
268. See Martin & Simmons, supra note 1, at 752 (explaining long-term benefits may be
achieved where institutions set policy free from domestic political pressures).
269. Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 15.
270. Id.
271. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
272. Susan Strange, The Name of the Game, in SEA-CHANGES: AMERICAN FOREIGN POL-
ICY IN A WORLD TRANSFORMED 238-48 (Nicholas X. Rizopoulos ed., 1990). See Keohane,
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In the Bananas Dispute,273 business interests were the true interests at
risk. Although the United States lodged a complaint against the E.U., the
real parties in interest were Chiquita Brands International ("Chiquita")
and its competitors. 2 ' The United States does not produce bananas for
export in any meaningful way. The only place bananas are grown in the
United States is Hawaii where they are, for the most part, locally con-
sumed.275 Chiquita, however, which employs no American production
workers, invested heavily in Latin American banana production. It hoped
the European market would stop favoring its former colonies like Ja-
maica, Dominica, St. Lucia, the Ivory Coast, and the Cameroons through
a protectionist quota regime. Chiquita destabilized the banana market by
flooding the market and driving prices down.276 When the E.U. tightened
its quota system further, Chiquita sought the intervention of the United
States government to challenge the E.U. system, which violated
GATT/WTO rules. The cost of that intervention was reportedly over six
million dollars paid to republicans, democrats, and Washington lobbyists
by representatives or affiliates of Chiquita The intervention worked;
the United States pressed an all out war in the WTO, even threatening a
Section 301 action for a product it does not export. Some European im-
ports, including handbags, lithographs, and bath oil, were consequently
subject to retaliatory tariffs that threatened to put United States importers
of those products out of business. 8 One industry analyst suggested that
Chiquita did not want an open banana market at all. Chiquita wanted a
larger quota. 279 As a result, the WTO threatened $191 million worth of
Moravcsik & Slaughter, supra note 175, at 463-64 (explaining that although access to VTO is
nominally controlled by states, in practice, industries are closely involved in the process).
273. See WTO, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribu-
tion of Bananas, WT/DS/27/R (May 22, 1997), at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop.e/dispu-e/distab-e.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2001); WTO, European Communities-
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9,
1997), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/distab-e.htm (last visited Aug. 6,
2001). See also Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 839 (2000) (discussing
dispute).
274. See Mary Footer, Developing Country Practice in the Matter of WTO Dispute Set-
tlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 55, 92 (2001) (noting one might conclude the bananas dispute
"has little to do with developing countries per se and everything to do with the interests of
large commercial operators"). See also Donald L. Bartlett and James B. Steele, How to Be-
come a Top Banana, TIME MAGAZINE, Feb. 7, 2000 at 43 [hereinafter Bartlett & Steele].
275. Bartlett & Steele, supra note 274, at 45.
276. See id.
277. Id. at 56.
278. Id. at 52-56. See Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Lifts Retaliatory Duties on EU Imports in
WTO Banana Case, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1017, 1033 (July 5, 2001) [hereinafter Bre-
vetti](noting tariffs have since been withdrawn and settlement has been reached).
279. See Brian Lavery, Trade Feud on Bananas Not as Clear as It Looks, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2001, at W1.
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sanctions against E.U. products, which eventually pressured the E.U. to
adopt a new licensing system.28°
The Chiquita story demonstrates how SERs change the rationalist
formula used by nations to measure the benefits of compliance or non-
compliance. SERs affect the price of behavior.2s' Rationalist conse-
quences, however, sometimes presuppose that state interests are
exogenous and fixed."2 Assuming state interests are endogenous, as the
modified constructivist model does, SERs may also affect identities and
interests .283
SERs affect state identities to a greater extent than non-SERs. Norms
influence state behavior and state identities. Assuming norms are them-
selves persuasive, then preferred norms multiply their own persuasion.
The SERs' norms strengthen and grow, not only because it is costly to
violate those norms, but also because the very (re)enforcement of those
norms exponentially increases their value. 4
If a norm protects an endangered species, such as the Tibetan Ante-
lope, that norm has some effect on state behavior, although it may not
determine the outcome in a particular dispute. The normative feedback
loop informs that effect of the norm. Assuming norms persuade in the
presence of a normative feedback loop, two questions remain. First, does
the norm have the same persuasive effect where there is a conflict with
another norm or value? The answer would seem to be "no." In such a
case, one would assume that the normative feedback loop would resolve
conflicts. When, for example, the WTO norm of non-discrimination
challenges the norm to protect the Tibetan Antelope, each norm loses
some persuasive value. That loss results from the normative feedback
loop, which balances the norms of the two regimes in light of current
constituency preferences.
Second, in the presence of conflict, does the norm have more per-
suasion in the absence of a normative feedback loop? The answer would
seem to be "yes." Discounting the normative feedback loop removes
280. See Brevetti, supra note 278, at 1033.
281. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
282. See Wendt, Collective Identity, supra note 22, at 384 (explaining rationalist "two-
step" interests "[a]re formed outside the interaction context, and then the latter is treated as
though it only affected behavior"). Wendt notes that some rationalists may see interests as
exogenous although not necessarily constant. Id.
283. Cf id. at 389 (arguing changes from rising interdependence as well as emergence of
a "common Other" will not only affect rationalist concerns but also identities/interests of
states involved).
284. Cf Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 72, at 494-501 (explaining both normative
and instrumentalist optics are necessary to explain state functioning, and each optic connects
to interests, reputations and international institutions). Keohane's explanation of the dual op-
tic, the instrumental and normative optic, demonstrates that norms (as well as interests)
influence international actors. Id.
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some competitive forces. Thus, SERs' norms will be enforced more fre-
quently than non-SER norms leading to: (i) greater (re)investment in
SER norms, providing more economic incentives to comply with those
norms; and, (ii) greater persuasion of those SER norms due to their con-
stant repetition. Further, the dilution of the normative feedback loop
results in: (i) less resistance to the persuasive effect of the already rein-
forced norm, and (ii) fewer conflicts with other norms and thus a greater
persuasive reinforcement of SER values.8
Norm competition and norm hierarchies will make non-SERs less
powerful within the modified constructivist framework. How debilitating
the effect is on the non-SERs, however, depends upon a number of fac-
tors, including the strength, history, and context of the norms involved
and their relationship to other norms.2 6 The debilitating effect of the
multiplication of SER norms therefore depends upon the characteristics
of the non-SER norms and the strength of the compliance factors dis-
cussed above.287
Modified constructivism suggests that SER norms will be internal-
ized domestically at a greater rate than non-SER norms. Internalization
occurs for all international norms to some extent as a function, or a con-
sequence, of compliance.8 Thus, international discourse inevitably helps
285. The extent of the distortion may depend upon the scope of the SER. A global SER
presumably would be more distorting than a regional SER.
286. Cf Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 939-40
(1996). Sunstein examined the impact of social norms on behavioral choices and listed several
factors that may be analogized into the regime context:
The extent of its effect will depend on five factors: (1) the intensity of the norm (ex-
actly how much opprobrium attaches to a violation?); (2) the nature of the norm
(what kind of attitude is signaled by a violation? what kind of attitude is provoked
by violators?); (3) the agent's attitude toward the norm and the opprobrium occa-
sioned by its violation (does the agent like to be seen as a defiant person? how does
the agent react to social opprobrium?); (4) the possibility of social approval or for-
giveness among relevant subgroups (will the agent's peer group support the norm-
defying act?); and (5) the nature and weight of the other ingredients in choice, in-
cluding competing norms, intrinsic value, and effects on self-conception (what must
a norm-complier sacrifice?).
Id.
287. Analyzing the level of SER effects within any particular regime is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, one can speculate that certain regimes, such as labor regimes, are par-
ticularly vulnerable. Additionally, compliance factors may also be influenced by the material
resources of the actors involved in any given dispute.
288. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 100, at 2646 (arguing that actors seek not
only to coerce compliance "but to internalize the new interpretation of the international norm
into the other party's internal normative system"). Id.
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to construct national identities. 9 Where a high level of compliance ex-
ists, a high level of internalization is likely present.
2 9
0
Additionally, the internalized norm will eventually alter the prefer-
ences relayed by the normative feedback loop. Once an individual
internalizes a norm, that actor continues to abide by that norm.29' Assum-
ing "national identities are not givens, but rather socially constructed
products of learning, knowledge, cultural processes and ideology, '292 then
internalization has an effect on national norm evolution. Because the
normative feedback loop has an important signaling effect of what states
value, the dilution of the normative feedback loop decreases the fre-
quency of the signaling effect. As noted, the normative feedback loop
"signals" national preferences, 293 which provides other international ac-
tors with important information about a nation's constituency
preferences. If internalization alters national norm formation, however,
the remaining normative feedback loop will eventually mimic SER val-
ues. "When norms become internalized in actors, actors are no longer
choosing to conform to them in any meaningful way.' 294 Internalization
will lead to increased observance and conformity of SER norms; 291 these
norms will "signal" the international community. 296
B. Response Mechanisms
Several possible responses to the value vacuum exist, such as in-
creased inter-regime integration, recognition, and subservience to non-
regime values within SERs; greater procedural process; greater access;
and independent efforts to improve non-SER compliance. Although
289. See id. at 2603, 2658 (reflecting upon the modem transformation of the domestic
legal system and the resulting effect that international law will have on national identities).
Koh posits that internalization explains why nations ultimately obey international law. Id.
290. Id. at 2656 (explaining that various types of "internalization" increase when there is
a high level of obedience to a rule).
291. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 904-05 (1998) (arguing that when legal norms are internalized,
conformity is almost automatic) [hereinafter Finnemore & Sikkink, International Norm Dy-
namics].
292. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 98, at 202.
293. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
294. See Finnemore & Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics, supra note 291, at 913.
295. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 60-68 (2d ed., Columbia University
Press 1979) (explaining various domestic forces that influence whether a nation observes
international law).
296. See Wendt, Collective Identity, supra note 22, at 404-05 (discussing signaling). The
practice of compliance with SER rules will reinforce those rules, transforming them from soft
to hard law. David Bederman notes "[w]hen international actors develop a standard of con-
duct, and even when it is expressly couched in the idiom of aspiration or informality, the
inevitable trend is that soft law hardens into legal obligation." Bederman, Review Essay, supra
note 58, at 484 (criticizing Arend's positive constructivism which rejects soft law).
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these cannot fill the value vacuum, they may serve to ameliorate its ef-
fects.
Accommodating non-SER values by integrating those values, or
linking them to SER values may fill the value vacuum. Integration or
linkage of non-SER values gives those values and constituencies a
"voice" in the SERs. Commentators suggest integration may foster the
inclusion of non-SER voices within SERs by adopting a more holistic
approach and incorporating the norms and agreements of transnational
civil society. 9 7 The steps involved in arriving at this reconceptualization,
however, are unclear. Incremental steps, such as increased participation
in SERs, greater transparency, and a willingness of the SERs themselves
to bow to non-SER norms seem necessary prerequisites.
Without a holistic approach, difficulties may arise when attempting
to increase regime integration. A regime may lack the institutional struc-
ture or competence to incorporate non-regime values.298 Although, for
example, the WTO recognizes environmental values through exceptions,
it lacks a social clause to account for human rights values.299 While envi-
ronmental values receive a voice in the WTO, human rights do not. Little
incentive exists for a regime operating at optimal output to decrease its
effectiveness simply to reach pareto superior results. To do so could hurt
the constituents of that regime. Arguably, integration may prevent the
implosion of an SER, and serve the long-term benefit of its constituents.
Thus, egoism and altruism may overlap depending upon one's time
frame notwithstanding rationalistic functioning. What is altruism this
year might be egoism over the next thirty years. Additionally, inefficien-
cies flow from imperfect information, therefore, an increased voice for
non-SERs may ameliorate some of the negative externalities for non-
regime values. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that anyone will listen
once non-regime values receive a voice in an SER. Lastly, the integration
within effective SERs may lead to "jurisdictional creep" and "increased
centralization"3°° that will only increase SER power.
297. Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 32-34 (discussing
proponents of a new liberal paradigm).
298. Id. at 10, 27 (noting WTO's lack of substantive environmental standards).
299. See GATT, supra note 4, art. XX. Article XX does provide an exception for legisla-
tion "relating to the products of prison labour." Id. Article XXI provides an exception to allow
nations to comply with obligations under the United Nations Charter "for the maintenance of
international peace and security." Id. art. XXI.
300. Cf AREND, LEGAL RULES, supra note 19, at 166-70 (commenting on the potential
increased centralization within the United Nations, the International Sea-Bed Authority, and
certain organs of the E.U.).
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SERs could alternatively bow to norms created by other regimes un-
der specific circumstances. 0 ' A party to both the WTO and CITES
should reasonably forgo complaining to the WTO if another nation sanc-
tions it for non-compliance to CITES.3 2 The consequences to Country Y,
however, are unclear. Perhaps the recognition of CITES as a near-
universally accepted agreement should preclude Country Y from seeking
relief in the WTO. °3 Maybe the WTO should bow to the generally ac-
cepted international agreement. In reality, difficulties may arise when
attempting to attain such restraint from the SERs. Efforts to do so
through regime exceptions and regime side agreements illustrate the dif-
ficulties of attaining such restraint. '0
The integration and the subjugation alternatives suggest that as in-
ternational regimes move toward autonomy and authority, thereby
diminishing the value of the normative feedback loop, they may take on
the status of international actors. Despite that international law recog-
nizes only states as international actors, perhaps room exists for regimes
to negotiate with each other in order to resolve integration and subjuga-
tion issues. If some regimes move toward supra-national governmental
status, a radical change in the traditional international relations analysis
may result.
Increased process within SERs may help account for non-SER val-
ues. Increased process would certainly lead to greater legitimacy.3 ' The
"fairness compliance pull" of SERs may therefore rise to the level of the
actual compliance achieved by enforcement. Allowing for greater trans-
parency and broader concepts of standing increases process and
fairness.3°6
301. Nichols, supra note 83, at 660 (arguing WTO interpretations should allow non-trade
values to trump free trade norms in certain cases). Nichols would permit non-trade societal
values to trump a trade value when the "the impediment to trade [is] incidental." Id. As Rich-
ard Shell points out, "Nichols's proposal is broadly reflective of Trade Stakeholder Model
values and would, in effect, protect trade stakeholders' voices at the domestic level by assuring
that their efforts to assert legitimate, nonprotectionist interests would be respected by the
WTO." Shell, supra note 31, at 921.
302. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 196, at 584 (discussing
possible scenarios where obligations under two international agreements may collide).
303. Cameron & Gray, supra note 132, at 266 ("[N]on-parties to a subsequent agreement
are not bound to those obligations unless the treaty codifies customary international law.").
304. See supra Part II.C.
305. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World
Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. L. REv. 511, 602-04 (2000); John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the
WTO-Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live up to the Moniker "World Trade
Court"?, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 739 (2000). The preceding scholars advocate greater
procedural protections within regimes, specifically within the trading regime.
306. See Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of
WTO Law, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 167, 169 (2001) (discussing recent debates over the transpar-
ency of the WTO).
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One potential solution to the effects of SERs flows from their ability
to avoid the normative feedback loop. The existence of these institutions
allows individuals to bypass their government in voicing their prefer-
ences. °7 As SERs open their doors to non-state actors, however,
questions of legitimacy and democratic accountability arise.3 8 The lib-
eral agency model feeds upon notions of accountability and legitimacy,
which are based on a sovereignty framework. The ability to bypass the
sovereign structure is not new, but it may become more appealing as tra-
ditional liberal routes dissolve. This latest development in globalization,
in some ways, represents a new perspective on the struggle between state
sovereignty and human values.3O While previous views focused on the
direct conflict between state sovereignty and natural rights, this new con-
flict deals with who will speak for the individual's interest in the
institutional arena.
Greater efforts, such as funding and strengthening non-SER en-
forcement provisions, can strengthen non-SER regimes. Funding
efficacy in non-SERs is one option. In negotiating NAFTA, for example,
the United States and Mexico formed the Border Environment Coopera-
tion Commission and North American Development Bank to help
finance greater environmental infrastructures in border areas. The Mont-
real Protocol Multilateral Fund likewise aids developing parties with
their compliance.1 ° Another option focuses on increased efforts to make
the dispute settlement mechanisms of other institutions stronger. To the
extent that non-SERs rely upon the traditional compliance mechanisms,
other than coercion, some effort could strengthen these mechanisms.
307. See Finnemore & Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics, supra note 291, at 893
(arguing that where norm entrepreneurs are a domestic minority, they may seek to use interna-
tional norms to strengthen their position).
308. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, International Law, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 567, 573-74 (2000).
A world that moves beyond states as legal actors faces an infinite number of possi-
ble participants. The problem is to manage participation of non-state actors both to
satisfy norms of democratic legitimacy (crafting mechanisms for deciding who
really represents whom, something formalistically assumed about states and their
citizens/subjects), as well as to channel their participation to allow for manageable
decision-making (too many players at the table and the real decision-making moves
elsewhere).
Id.
309. See, e.g., Samuel K. Murumba, Grappling with a Grotian Moment: Sovereignty and
the Questfora Normative World Order, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 829, 831 (1993) (proposing the
need for a normative solution to the continuing conflict between state sovereignty and "real
human interests").
310. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989); Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on Sub-




Issue networks may also contribute to improving traditional compliance
factors by increasing publicity disincentives of non-compliance with
non-SER norms."' All of these options can be explored in greater detail
theoretically and empirically.
In the interim, a value vacuum seems to be present in the dispute be-
tween Countries X and Y If Country X's constituency truly wants to
protect the Tibetan Antelope, it may pay a heavy price (one that the
WTO can impose) for that desire. Country Y, and other countries for that
matter, will see that investment in an SER provides stability and predict-
ability. The identities of both Country X and Country Y will change as a
result of the forgoing, and they will bring these new identities to their
next dispute.
CONCLUSION
A new transformation is occurring in the constitutive structures of
international relations. Modified constructivism explicates potential con-
sequences of SERs and gives some insights into how to change the
institutional model to compensate for the value vacuum-if indeed that
is desirable. Perhaps, however, focusing on the links between SERs, non-
SERs, domestic institutions, and various interest groups is appropriate.
Identifying the design features that facilitate the type of inter-state inter-
action most likely to positively transform identities and interests around
a preferred international norm may also help. Consider also compensat-
ing rationalistic forces by increased process, integration, and
subjugation. Each approach presents the same substantive difficulty of
how to balance different regime values.
Whatever the approach to balancing regime values, the effect that
balancing has on national identity and value formation remains impor-
tant. The "normative, dynamic and constitutive" ' effects that SERs may
have on the internalization process demands consideration if, as some
suggest, the preferred method of compliance is internalization of
norms."3 SERs engender more norm internalization than non-SERs and
discount the normative feedback loop to promote their values at the cost
of non-SERs and potential constituency preferences. The SERs' effects
require empirical confirmation that may take some time to materialize.
311. See Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, supra note 47, at 11 (noting that al-
though states are important actors, they are not the only ones).
312. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 100, at 2646 (discussing transnational le-
gal process).
313. Id. at 2645-46 (concluding that both the fairness and managerial models of compli-
ance suggest "the key to more compliance is better internalized compliance").
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The foregoing hypothesis, however, suggests some areas where assess-
ment of SER implications should begin. This, too, will raise a number of
questions for empirical research.
Will national actors find it more in their interest to bypass the na-
tional forum in favor of the international forum? What effect will this
have on national norm development? Does the dilution of the normative
feedback loop forever bias the modified constructivist equation? Will the
values of SERs multiply exponentially? Can institutions respond to fill
the value vacuum created by the dilution of the normative feedback
loop? It is too early to answer these questions, but it is time to ask them.
